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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
VOL. 98 NOVEMBER 1998 NO. 7
WHEN DOES PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION JUSTIFY PUBLIC
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION?
Ian Ayres* and Fredrick E. Vars**
At a moment when judicial tolerance of race-conscious government ac-
tion seems to be waning, this Article develops a new set of constitutionally
viable justifications for affirmative action. Rather than enter the familiar
debate over the legitimacy of the Court's application of strict scrutiny to reme-
dial affirmative action, Ayres & Vars excavate widely overlooked language
in the Supreme Court decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,
which notes the ability of government to eradicate the effects of private, not
just governmental or "public," discrimination. The authors develop three
justifications for remedying private discrimination through public affirma-
tive action, each of which produces non-arbitrary goals that do not unduly
burden "innocent" third parties-making them narrowly tailored to a com-
pelling governmental interest. Thus, the authors re-cast Croson, an opin-
ion routinely understood as the death knell for affirmative action, into a
model for its redirection and possible expansion.
Beginning with the story of Marian Anderson's 1939 concert at the
Lincoln Memorial the authors demonstrate how public affirmative action
used to remedy private discrimination is neither counter-intuitive nor un-
precedented in our historical memory. They then focus on affirmative action
in government procurement, and demonstrate how the larger size of private
markets and the stronger evidence of private discrimination suggest that the
future of affirmative action in procurement may turn largely on private dis-
crimination justifications. Three private discrimination rationales follow:
(1) to ensure that government spending does not directly or indirectly facili-
tate private discrimination (the "causal"justification); (2) to correct for the
depressive effect of private discrimination on the capacity of minority-owned
firms (the "but-for"justification); and, most radically, (3) to compensate for
shortfalls in private sales caused by purely private discrimination, so long as
the scope of the government remedy is restricted to that particular market (the
"single-market" justification). The Article applies the justifications it offers
* William K. Townsend Professor, Yale Law School; Ph.D. (Economics) M.I.T., 1988;
J.D. Yale Law School, 1986; B.A. Yale College, 1981.
** J.D. Yale Law School, expected 1999; A.B. Princeton University, 1995. Timothy
Bates, Bill Bowen, Bill Carney, David Goldberg, John Jeffries, Jr., Jonathan Macey, Dan
Ortiz, Victor Rosenblum, Peter Siegelman, Paul Sonn, Bill Spriggs and seminar
participants at Cornell, Florida State, Kansas, Valparaiso, and Yale law schools provided
helpful comments. (Professor Ayres has advised the Justice Department in its post-Adarand
review of affirmative action. The authors have also submitted comments to the Small
Business Administration and the Department of Transportation. The opinions expressed
in this Article are not necessarily the views of the Justice Department, or any other federal
agency.)
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to the related context of employment and argues that public remedies for pri-
vate discrimination in employment can be narrowly tailored. Thus, a posi-
tion which at first appears to be incompatible with the Supreme Court's pres-
ent unwillingness to uphold affirmative action programs emerges as a
remarkably compelling and constitutionally grounded argument in support
of the government's ability to remedy private discrimination in a wide array
of settings.
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Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere.1
INTRODUCTION
Marian Anderson was a contralto with a voice of rare power, a voice
that Toscanini said "came once in a hundred years."'2 But in the late
1. Martin Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail (Apr. 16, 1963), in Why We
Can't Wait 76, 77 (1964).
2. Liane Hansen, Marian Anderson Sings, Weekend Edition, Transcript #97022315-
215 (National Public Radio broadcast, Feb. 23, 1997) [hereinafter Hansen].
The authors thank David Goldberg for suggesting this historical parallel. A more
accessible version of the Marian Anderson discussion appeared in the Los Angeles Times
shortly after the 59th anniversary of Anderson's Easter performance. See Ian Ayres,
Remedying Past Discrimination: Following the 'Anderson' Model, L.A. Times, Apr. 26,
1998, at M2.
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1930s, the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) refused to rent
Constitution Hall-the only large concert hall in Washington, D.C. at the
time-to Anderson because she was black. Eleanor Roosevelt was out-
raged by the DAWs action and not only resigned from the organization,
but prompted the National Park Service to invite Anderson to sing at the
Lincoln Memorial on Easter Sunday, 1939.3 The concert was a monu-
mental success. More than 75,000 people came to hear Anderson sing
before the statue of the Great Emancipator and millions more listened by
radio.4 Beyond the concert's emotional impact, the event soon came to
be seen "as the first strategic victory of the modem civil rights move-
ment."5 Decades later, when Martin Luther King, Jr. chose to speak at
the Lincoln Memorial, the memory of the masses assembling for
Anderson's concert must have served as a guide. 6
Amazingly, many federal courts today would probably find
Anderson's invitation unconstitutional, because they believe that the gov-
ernment can take race-conscious action only to remedy its own discrimi-
nation.7 Even the Clinton Justice Department-which as a general mat-
ter has worked so assiduously at trying to "mend, not end"8 affirmative
action-has explicitly rejected private discrimination as a rationale for
public affirmative action:
3. Roosevelt influenced Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior, to have the
National Park Service issue this extraordinary invitation. Before the recital began, Ickes
addressed the audience: "Genius, genius draws no color line. She has endowed Marian
Anderson with such a voice as lifts any individual above his fellows, as is a matter of
exultant pride to any race." Hansen, supra note 2; cf. Charles L. Black, My World with
Louis Armstrong, 95 Yale LJ. 1595 (1986) (describing the genius of Louis Armstrong).
4. See Marian Anderson: A Life in Song-Singing to the Nation, Penn Library
Exhibitions [hereinafter Singing to the Nation] (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://www.lib.
upenn.edu/special/gallery/anderson/lincoln.html> (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); see also Marian Anderson, My Lord, What a Morning- An Autobiography (1992).
5. Marian Anderson 1897-1993 (visited Feb. 8, 1998) <http://www.ctfonrun.org-
cwhf/anderson.html> (on file with the Columbia Law Review). In July, 1939, Eleanor
Roosevelt presented Anderson the NAACP's Spingarn Medal. See Singing to the Nation,
supra note 4. Four years later, the DAR reversed its policy and invited Anderson to sing at
Constitution Hall. See id.
6. The 75,000 person audience was the largest to date ever assembled at the
Memorial. See Singing to the Nation, supra note 4. A dramatic picture of Anderson
singing before the mass assemblage can be viewed at Marian Anderson: A Life in Song-
Photographs from: Lincoln Memorial Concert, Washington, D.C., 9 April 1939 (visited
Feb. 8, 1998) <www.lib.upenn.edu./special/gallery/anderson/linimage2.html> (on file
with the Columbia Law Review), and a moving quicktime clip of her singing "My Country
'Tis of Thee" at the Memorial can be found at Videotape of Marian Anderson Perform-
ing at the Lincoln Memorial, Washington, D.C., Easter Sunday 1939 (visited Feb. 8,
1998) < w.lib.upenn.edu/special/gallery/anderson/av/lincoln.html> (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
7. See infra note 17 (cases cited).
8. John F. Harris, Clinton Avows Support For Affirmative Action: "Mend It, but Don't
End It," President Says in Speech, Wash. Post, July 20, 1995, at Al (quoting July 19, 1995
speech at the National Archives).
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[A]ffirmative action in federal procurement is not a means to
make up for opportunities minority-owned firms may have lost
in the private sector .... 9
But the whole purpose of Anderson's invitation was to make up for the
opportunities she lost in the private sector. The federal government at
that time did not normally open the Lincoln Memorial for public con-
certs. The invitation to Anderson was a race-conscious preference, a form
of affirmative action, to remedy the DAR's private discrimination.
Anderson's invitation was one of the federal government's first attempts
in this century to rectify the continuing harms of racial discrimination.
Yet, somehow, we have gone from thinking that making up for private
discrimination is an appropriate first step to thinking such remediation is
illegal.
Rejecting private discrimination as a rationale for public affirmative
action has ramifications far beyond the provision of concert space. Limit-
ing public affirmative action to remedying discrimination by the govern-
ment itself may eviscerate affirmative action in federal contracting.
Jeffrey Rosen has offered the following syllogism, which succinctly sum-
marizes the argument: " [T] he Supreme Court will only uphold federal
racial set-asides in light of convincing evidence of past discrimination by
the federal government itself; but, for almost twenty years, the federal
government has been discriminating in favor of minority contractors
rather than against them."' 0 From these two premises Rosen concluded
that federal set-asides were doomed.
Rosen's first premise, that the federal government can act only to
remedy its own discrimination, is not true. In City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice White, concluded that the City of Richmond "can use its spending
powers to remedy private discrimination, if it identifies that discrimina-
tion with the particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment.""
And, while Croson concerned state and local procurement, the Court in
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena has more recently held that the Croson
analysis applies to federal programs. 12 Thus, even though Croson and
9. Response to Comments to Department ofJustice Proposed Reforms to Affirmative
Action in Federal Procurement, 62 Fed. Reg. 25,648, 25,650 (1997).
10. Jeffrey Rosen, The Day the Quotas Died, New Republic, Apr. 22, 1996, at 26. Like
Rosen, we confine our attention primarily to affirmative action based on race.
11. 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (plurality opinion). Although this statement appeared
in a plurality opinion, a majority of the Justices in Croson accepted private discrimination as
a constitutionally sufficient rationale for a racial set-aside. See id. at 538 (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., dissenting) ("the interest in ensuring that the
government does rot reflect and reinforce prior private discrimination in dispensing
public contracts is... compelling").
12. And, while the Adarand Court emphasized "congruence" in applying strict
scrutiny to both state and federal affirmative action programs, see Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995), it did not repudiate the principle that Congress
deserves greater deference than states because Congress is a co-equal branch of
government and explicitly charged with enforcement power by Section 5 of the Fourteenth
[Vol. 98:15771580
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Adarand are usually viewed as restricting the government's ability to im-
plement affirmative action (by subjecting such legislation to strict scru-
tiny),' 3 these decisions in at least one dimension expand that ability-by
Amendment. See id. at 231 ("We need not, and do not, address these differences [in
deference] today."); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 490 (plurality opinion) ("Congress, unlike
any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitutional mandate to enforce the
dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in
Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042, 26,051 (1996) (noting that Congress's mandate
of enforcement under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments means it "need not
make findings of discrimination with the same degree of precision as do state or local
governments"). Some commentators have missed this point. See, e.g., Proposed Reform
of the 8(A) Program Through H.R. 3994, The Entrepreneur Development Program Act of
1996: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Bus., 104th Cong. 92, 2d Sess. (1996)
(statement of Jeffrey Rosen, Legal Affairs Editor, The New Republic) [hereinafter Rosen
Testimony]; The Constitutionality of Race-based Preferences: Oversight Hearing on the
Impact of Adarand v. Pena Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Federalism, and
Property Rights and the House Judiciary Comm. Subcomm. on the Constitution, 104th
Cong. 651 (1995) (statement of George R. La Noue, Director of the Project on Civil Rights
and Public Contracts) [hereinafter La Noue Statement]. The first federal court to rule on
this question concluded that: "Reading Adarand and Croson together, it is clear that race-
conscious actions by Congress must meet a strict scrutiny standard, but in determining
whether they do so, Courts should give Congress somewhat greater deference." Cortez III
Serv. Corp. v. NASA, 950 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D.D.C. 1996).
As noted above, Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides Congress with
constitutional power to enforce the Equal Protection Clause. This clearly supports the
proposition that Congress is entitled to greater deference than states on matters touched
by that Amendment. But because the Equal Protection Clause is directed specifically
towards states, it is more difficult to read Section 5 as creating power for Congress to
remedy private discrimination. However, the Thirteenth Amendment may provide
Congress with power to counter private discrimination in contracting.
Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits "slavery or involuntary servitude,"
and Section 2 is an enforcement provision exactly parallel to Section 5 of the Fourteenth.
Pursuant to Section 2, Congress enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994), which protects the right
of all citizens to enter into and enforce contracts. The Supreme Court has held that
"[s]urely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to
determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the authority to translate
that determination into effective legislation." Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,
440 (1968). One might plausibly infer that congressional action to eradicate the effects of
private discrimination in contracting (as a "badge of slavery") is subject to rational relation
review, rather than strict scrutiny. Of course, such action is still subject to the judicially-
incorporated Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment, see Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 213-18, but there remains a relatively strong textual argument for greater deference to
Congress.
In this Article, we follow Adarand's mandate of "congruence" without considering
residual deference to Congress. However, if the private discrimination rationales offered
satisfy the Croson standard for justifying state and local affirmative action, then they apply a
fortiori to congressional programs.
13. This doctrinal development has drawn harsh criticism. See, e.g., Kathleen M.
Sullivan, City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co.: The Backlash Against Affirmative Action, 64
Tul. L. Rev. 1609 (1990). This Article does not enter the familiar debate over the
appropriateness of strict scrutiny; rather, we take strict scrutiny as a given and outline when
affirmative action based on private discrimination can satisfy the Croson standard.
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making clear that remedying private discrimination is a compelling inter-
est of state and federal governments. 14
The idea that government affirmative action can only be used to
remedy government discrimination comes from Justice Powell's plurality
opinion in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, which noted that the
Supreme Court: "has insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination
by the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial
classifications in order to remedy such discrimination." 15 But Croson
overturned this Wygant limitation by squarely holding that remedying
private discrimination is a compelling governmental interest.' 6 Notwith-
standing Croson, many federal circuits (and commentators such as Rosen)
continue to insist that governmental units can only use affirmative action
to remedy their own discrimination. 17 This Article seeks to end this mis-
14. Scholars from opposing perspectives have noted this change. Compare Judith C.
Areen et a]., Constitutional Scholars' Statement on Affirmative Action After City of
Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 98 Yale LJ. 1711, 1713 (1989) ("The Supreme Court has
rejected the notion[ ] that race-conscious affirmative action measures adopted by a local
government or other body must as a constitutional matter be limited to redressing the
effects of that government's or body's own past discrimination .... ."), with Charles Fried,
Affirmative Action After City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.: A Response to the Scholars'
Statement, 99 Yale LJ. 155, 160 (1989) ("The Court makes clear that a governmental unit
may act to remedy not only its own past discrimination but that of identified others within
its jurisdiction.").
Even though he recognized the important point, Fried subtly misconstrued Croson.
What is essential for a constitutionally sufficient predicate for affirmative action after
Croson is not that rhe "others" be identified, but that the discrimination be identified. If
individual private discriminators could be identified, race-neutral enforcement of anti-
discrimination law,, would suffice.
15. 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion of Powell, J.).
16. See Croson, 488 U.S. 469, rev'g 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987). The Croson decision
overruled the Fou-th Circuit's holding that "[flindings of societal discrimination will not
suffice; the findings must concern 'prior discrimination by the government [sic] unit
involved.'" 822 F.2d at 1358 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274). See infra text
accompanying notes 122-125 for a more extensive discussion of the relationship between
Wygant and Croson.
17. In as many as ten federal circuit and district courts, majority opinions have
favorably quoted the Wygant language limiting race-conscious remedies to the
.governmental unit involved" notwithstanding the interceding Croson decision. See Messer
v. Meno, 130 F.3d [30, 136 (5th Cir. 1997); Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1162
(6th Cir. 1994); In re Birmingham Reverse Discrimination Employment Litig., 20 F.3d
1525, 1540 (11th Cir. 1994); Billish v. City of Chicago, 962 F.2d 1269, 1280 (7th Cir. 1992);
Hiller v. County of Suffolk, 977 F. Supp. 202, 206 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); McLaughlin v. Boston
Sch. Comm., 938 F. Supp. 1001, 1008 (D. Mass. 1996); Koski v. Gainer, No. 92 C 3293, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14604, *40 (N.D. Ill. 1995); Mallory v. Harkness, 895 F. Supp. 1556, 1559
(S.D. Fla. 1995); Shuford v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 846 F. Supp. 1511, 1521 (M.D. Ala.
1994); Concrete Gen., Inc. v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm'n, 779 F. Supp. 370,
378 (D. Md. 1991". For additional examples of continued misplaced reliance on the
Wygant limitation, s;ee our discussions of Taxnan v. Board of Education of Piscataway, 91
F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (June 27, 1997), cert.
dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (Dec. 2, 1997), and Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), infra notes 200, 205-208 and accompanying
text.
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placed reliance on Wygant and instead identifies when affirmative action
in government procurement to remedy private discrimination can be
"narrowly tailored" to pass strict scrutiny.
Rosen's syllogism, while flawed, usefully underscores the importance
of private discrimination. His second premise-that the federal govern-
ment has not been discriminating for twenty years-may be much closer
to the truth. As an empirical matter, government discrimination, stand-
ing alone, may not suffice to justify the current patterns of affirmative
action in state and federal procurement. While government discrimina-
tion in some procurement markets may be a thing of the past,' 8 the same
cannot be said of private discrimination. 19 Underutilization 20 of minority
At the same time, several circuits have correctly recognized that Croson modified the
Wygant limitation. See Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d
1513, 1529 (10th Cir. 1994); Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1002
n.10 (3d Cir. 1993); O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 429 (D.C.
Cir. 1992) (Ginsburg, J., concurring); Tennessee Asphalt Co. v. Farris, 942 F.2d 969, 974
(6th Cir. 1991); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 916 n.6 (9th Cir. 1991).
For example, the Ninth Circuit wrote:
The declaration of the Croson plurality that a city "can use its spending powers to
remedy private discrimination," in conjunction with the opinion of the three
dissentingjustices, appears implicitly to overrule our requirement in AGCC I that
to justify a race-based preference, "the state or local government must be acting
to remedy government-imposed discrimination."
Associated Gen. Contractors Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1413 n.10
(9th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted); see also Am. Subcontractors Ass'n v. City of Atlanta,
376 S.E.2d 662, 664 n.5 (Ga. 1989) (citing to Croson in support of state's right to remedy
private discrimination).
18. Racial discrimination persists in other areas of government action. African
Americans and Hispanics are routinely discriminated against in the criminal justice system.
See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Joel Waldfogel, A Market Test for Race Discrimination in Ball
Setting, 46 Stan. L. Rev. 987, 990-91 & nn.11-14 (1994) (citing, among several others, a
report that found bail amounts in Hartford, Connecticut, for black defendants to be 70
percent higher than for white defendants); David C. Baldus et al., Comparative Review of
Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 661, 707-10 (1983) (reporting a substantial race-of-victim disparity in the
imposition of the death penalty in Georgia); Paul W. Valentine, ACLU Files Suit Against
Md. Police; Group Says Blacks Targeted Along 1-95, Wash. Post, June 5, 1998, at B1
(noting, in addition to the Maryland suit, legal action against law enforcement agencies in
New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Indiana). In recent years, several hundred (mostly
state and local) law enforcement officials attended the infamous "Good 01' Boys
Roundup" gathering in Tennessee. See Pierre Thomas, Treasury Finds Limited
Involvement in "Roundup," Wash. Post, Jan. 6, 1996, at A14. Federal loan programs and
employment are plagued by racial discrimination. See, e.g., Michael A. Fletcher, Weighing
in "Hard" Against USDA Discrimination, Wash. Post, Feb. 9, 1998, at A17 (reporting a
backlog of around 1000 complaints from minority farmers of discrimination in lending);
Michael A. Fletcher, Bias Settlement Approved in Corps of Engineers Case; Pittsburgh
District to Pay Blacks $800,000, Wash. Post, Jan. 25, 1997, at A9 (settlement addressed
subjection of black employees to physical abuse, verbal abuse, and job discrimination).
19. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car
Negotiations, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 817 (1991) (finding systematic discrimination against
women and African Americans in auto sales) [hereinafter Ayres, Fair Driving]; J. Linn
Allen, Civil Wrongs, Chi. Trib., Nov. 14, 1993, at C1 (citing HUD findings that blacks
1998] 1583
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businesses is a much bigger problem in private markets than in public
markets. Indeed, there may be some public markets where minority
firms are not underutilized at all. 2 1 If affirmative action procurement
programs in these areas are going to pass constitutional muster, it will be
because of underutilization in private markets. Thus, our focus on pri-
vate discrimination is not just a nice question of law-it is likely to be-
come the critical question in deciding the future of the federal govern-
ment's 10 billion dollar race-conscious procurement programs. 22
Croson, however, did not fully explain what types of private discrimi-
nation are remediable. It is clear that certain forms of "societal discrimi-
nation" do not create a sufficient factual predicate. 23 For instance, the
Court rejected evidence of discriminatory exclusion of blacks from skilled
construction trade unions and training programs as too amorphous to
support race-conscious preferences for minority businesses.2 4 At the
same time, however, the Court suggested that discriminatory exclusion of
eligible minority-owned businesses from professional trade associa-
tions could suffice: "In such a case, the city would have a compelling
interest in preventing its tax dollars from assisting these organizations in
maintaining a racially segregated construction market."25 Consequently,
it is unclear how evidence of private discrimination might be used to vali-
date an affirmative action program.
experience discrimination over half of the times they try to buy or rent a home, and that
levels of housing discrimination in 1993 were "basically unchanged" from the 1970s);
PrimeTime Live: True Colors, (ABC television broadcast, Sept. 26, 1991) (transcript on
file ivith the Columbia Law Review) (using undercover cameras and matched testers to
document blatant discrimination in employment, car sales, and housing) [hereinafter
PrimeTime Live].
20. In Croson, Justice O'Connor suggested that public entities could prove the
requisite discrimination in a market by comparing the minority market share of contracts
(utilization) to the minority market share of qualified firms (availability). O'Connor
suggested that "some form of narrowly tailored racial preference might be necessary to
break down patterns of deliberate exclusion" on the basis of "a significant statistical
disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors willing and able to perform
a particular service and the number of such contractors actually engaged by the locality or
the locality's prime contractors." Croson, 488 U.S. at 509. While O'Connor measured
utilization in terms of the minority share of the number of contracts, some lower courts
applying Croson have implied that the percentage of contract dollars going to minority-
owned firms would be a better measure. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of
Columbus, 936 F. Supp. 1363, 1389 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (concluding that availability statistics
that did not account for the smaller average size of MBEs were "invalid"). We consider the
significance of this difference below, see infra notes 58, 114.
21. See infra Part I.B.
22. See George Stephanopoulos & Christopher Edley, Jr., Affirmative Action Review:
Report to the President, July 19, 1995, at 62-63.
23. Croson, 48.3 U.S. at 497. Justice O'Connor noted thatJustice Powell in both Bakke
and Wygant distinguished "between 'societal discrimination' which is an inadequate basis
for race-conscious classifications, and the type of identified discrimination that can support
and define the scope of race-based relief." Id.
24. See id. at 498-99.
25. Id. at 503.
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This Article attempts to answer this question. We offer three broad
justifications for using evidence of private discrimination to narrowly tai-
lor affirmative action in government procurement, which for conven-
ience we label as the causal, but-for, and single-market justifications.
26
The Causal Justification. The causal justification is based on the gov-
ernment's compelling interest in ensuring that its spending does not
cause private discrimination. The causal justification was implicitly em-
braced by Croson's "passive participant" discussion:
[I]f the city could show that it had essentially become a "passive
participant" in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements
of the local construction industry, we think it clear that the city
could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system. It is be-
yond dispute that any public entity, state or federal, has a com-
pelling interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from the
tax contributions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil
of private prejudice.
2 7
The causal justification allows the government to more narrowly tailor
the affirmative action to remedy discrimination that the government itself
has caused.2 8 Thus, if prime contractors working on government con-
tracts are shown to discriminate against minority subcontractors, then the
government should be able to implement affirmative action on behalf of
the affected subcontractors. In this sense, the government is a passive
participant in private discrimination when its procurement facilitates pri-
vate discrimination.
The But-For Justification. There is, however, a second way that the gov-
ernment can be a "passive participant." The government is a passive par-
ticipant in private discrimination when it does not adjust its affirmative
action goal to account for how private discrimination has reduced minor-
ity availability-i.e., reduced the number of minority firms that are ready,
willing, and able to perform. This second meaning is most clearly cap-
tured by Croson's analysis of discrimination by local contractors' associa-
tions. When a private association refuses to accredit minority businesses,
the government would be a passive participant in the association's private
discrimination if the government relied on membership status as a crite-
rion for bidder eligibility: "In such a case, the city would have a compel-
ling interest in preventing its tax dollars from assisting these organiza-
tions in maintaining a racially segregated construction market."29 Even
26. While the bulk of this Article is concerned solely with affirmative action in
procurement, we briefly apply our thesis to the employment context. See infra Part V.
27. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.
28. We examine two versions of this causal argument: (1) direct causation, i.e., when
prime contractors on government jobs discriminate with public money in the awarding of
subcontracts; and (2) indirect causation, i.e., when government money facilitates private
discrimination, by giving government contractors more financial freedom to discriminate
on nongovernment jobs. The Croson Court approved affirmative action as a response to
the direct causal case with language that also supports the broader second justification.
29. Croson, 488 U.S. at 503.
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though the government did not cause the private discrimination, the gov-
ernment can constitutionally take action to ensure that its procurement
process is not distorted by the private discrimination.
This second "passive participant" theory suggests that the govern-
ment would be justified in changing its procurement criteria so that it
would purchase as much from minority firms as it would but for private
discrimination. In standard terms, this would mean making a "but-for"
adjustment to increase the estimate of available minority firms to what it
would be absent private discrimination.
But Croson makes clear that not all types of discrimination would be
remediable under a but-for theory. We argue that the government
should be able to make but-for availability adjustments to counteract the
effects of private discrimination against the minority businesses qua minor-
ity businesses. Private (or government) discrimination against the much
larger class of potential minority entrepreneurs would not be remediable
by affirmative action in procurement. This distinction suggests that but-
for adjustments should not be used to estimate how many more minority
firms would exist but for private discrimination, but should be limited to
estimating how much more available existing firms would be-in terms of
capacity or ability to charge a lower price-in the absence of private
discrimination.
Restricting the types of remediable private discrimination is neces-
sary to satisfy the narrow-tailoring requirements that remedies be neither
arbitrary nor unduly burdensome. Estimating how many more firms
would exist absent discrimination against potential entrepreneurs is nec-
essarily more attenuated than estimating how much more capacity ex-
isting minority firms would have in the absence of discrimination; thus,
estimates based on existing firms offer a less arbitrary basis for tailoring
an affirmative action goal. Furthermore, restricting the remedy to
counteract private discrimination against minority firms is less burden-
some to disfavored nonminority firms. Nonminority businesses that are
disadvantaged by the but-for adjustment in competing for a small propor-
tion of government purchases are not "unduly burdened" if the govern-
ment can show that they are the beneficiaries of private discrimination
with regard to selling the same product. But-for adjustments to remedy
societal discrimination against potential minority entrepreneurs, in con-
trast, are more burdensome to nonminority businesses because they may
not have benefitted as directly from the private discrimination. This cri-
terion nicely explains the examples discussed in Croson itself. While the
Court suggested that but-for adjustments to counteract private discrimi-
nation which excluded minority-owned businesses from professional
trade associations would be constitutional, it maintained that but-for ad-
justments to counteract private discrimination in education or employ-
ment markets against potential minority entrepreneurs would be
unconstitutional.
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The Single-Market Justification. The but-for justification suggests that
the government can constitutionally act to remedy the effects of private
discrimination which it has not caused. The crucial requirement is a non-
arbitrary estimate of how much private discrimination against minority
firms has reduced minority sales to the government (i.e., how much more
the government would have purchased but for private discrimination).
But a parallel argument suggests a final "single-market"justification: The
government should be able to use affirmative action in procurement not
just to correct shortfalls in government purchasing caused by private dis-
crimination, but also to correct shortfalls in private purchasing caused by
private discrimination.
Our core thesis is that the government can remedy shortfalls in pri-
vate purchasing only when the firms disadvantaged by the government's
affirmative action were likely beneficiaries of the private discrimination.
This principle implies that the government cannot use affirmative action
in one market to remedy discrimination in another. But when purchas-
ing a particular product, the government should be able to remedy pri-
vate discrimination against sellers of the same product. The but-for ad-
justment does just this to remedy shortfalls in government purchasing;
the single-market justification expands the procurement remedy to cor-
rect for shortfalls in private purchasing.
While the Supreme Court has rejected generalized claims of past dis-
crimination that "provide[ ] no guidance for a legislative body to deter-
mine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to remedy,"30 estimating the
impact of private discrimination on the minority market share in a partic-
ular industry provides a non-arbitrary basis31 for selecting a utilization
target. Indeed, the same utilization analysis suggested by Justice
O'Connor in Croson regarding government procurement can be applied
to private purchases of the same products to determine whether a
shortfall in minority participation exists. 32 If a utilization analysis of pri-
vate purchases in a particular market suggests that minority businesses
are selling less than one would expect absent discrimination, then the
government may constitutionally increase its purchases of that product
from minority businesses to offset the private discrimination.
33
30. Id. at 498.
31. Although this exact phrase did not appear in Croson (or in other Supreme Court
cases on affirmative action), we believe it accurately captures one of the criteria Justice
O'Connor applied in Croson. See infra note 68.
32. While several commentators have criticized the Croson underutilization approach,
see, e.g., Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1781, 1819-20 (1996) [hereinafter
Ayres, Narrow Tailoring]; George R. La Noue, Social Science and Minority "Set-Asides,"
110 Public Interest 49, 57-62 (Winter 1993), our point is that whatever method one uses to
determine a non-arbitrary amount to remedy the government shortfall in minority
purchases could be applied as well to determine an amount to remedy the private shortfall.
33. If guardrail producers do not compete with businesses that engage in other types
of construction, then the government could not use minority underutilization in these
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Nonminority businesses disadvantaged by affirmative action in com-
peting for a proportion of government purchases are not "unduly bur-
dened" if the government can show that they are the beneficiaries of pri-
vate discrimination with regard to the same product. The crucial test is
whether the nonminority firms disadvantaged by a remedial program in a
particular market have benefitted from private discrimination in the form
of increased private sales. If the answer to this question is yes, then the
government should be able to use affirmative action in procurement to
narrowly tailor a remedy that does not unduly burden the nonminority
competitors.
This single-market justification might dramatically increase govern-
ment utilization targets. Because the private consumption of most prod-
ucts is often much larger than government consumption, and because
private discrimination is more pronounced, 4 a goal of remedying private
discrimination might conceivably justify the government purchasing 100
percent of certain products from minority firms. Take, for example, the
$2.9 billion spent by the Department of Defense (DoD) in prime contract
awards for construction in 1992. This figure represented roughly one
percent of the $307 billion (combined public and private) construction
market in that year. Minority Business Enterprises (MBEs) were 9.1 per-
cent of all construction firms, but earned only 5.1 percent of public and
private sales.3 5 No doubt, much of this four percentage point disparity
was due to the fact that minority-owned firms are, on average, smaller and
younger. But suppose that one-quarter of this difference, or one per-
centage point, could be attributed to discrimination. In order to increase
the overall MBE market share to the level one would expect absent pri-
vate discrimination (6.1 percent), the DoD would have to direct 100 per-
cent of its prime construction contracts to MBEs.
We ultimately argue that 100 percent targets violate the Equal
Protection Clause. But at a minimum, the government should still be
able to engage in what we term "proportional overutilization." If there is
a gross underutilization of minority contractors of 3 percent in the pri-
vate market, the government should be able to engage in a gross over-
utilization of 3 percent with respect to its purchases. The government's
ability to remedy private discrimination would be limited to the govern-
ment's overall size in the market. If, for instance, government purchases
represented 10 percent of the overall (private and public) market, the
government's overutilization would make up for 10 percent of the private
underutilization. The "proportional overutilization" approach would
usually cap the government's minority utilization target well below 30
other types of construction to justify race-conscious purchasing of guardrails. See infra text
accompanying notes 146-148.
34. See Timothy Bates, Viewing Minority Business Assistance as a Job-Creation
Strategy 30 (Mar. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia Law Review);
infra text accompanying notes 41-61.
35. See infra notes 38, 51, and 53.
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percent and would tie the scope of the remedy to the government's rela-
tive position in the overall market. We also offer a more aggressive "shift-
ing availability" approach for calculating the government's utilization tar-
get, which would assume that the underutilized capacity in the private
sector was shifted to the public sector. Both approaches avoid the expres-
sive harm of a 100 percent minority procurement goal.
This Article is divided into four parts. Part I provides the empirical
impetus for our analysis by summarizing evidence that underutilization of
minority businesses is a much larger problem in private markets than in
government purchasing. Parts II through IV examine our causal, but-for,
and single-market theories for using private discrimination to justify pub-
lic affirmative action. Part V analyzes how private discrimination could be
used to justify government affirmative action in employment.
I. TBE EMmiucAL IMPORTANCE OF PRIVATE DIscRIMINATIoN
Two stylized facts suggest that the way the Court adumbrates the con-
tours of the private discrimination rationale is likely to have a dramatic
impact on the scope of constitutional race-conscious procurement. In
this Part, we provide prima facie evidence for the following propositions:
(1) Private markets are much larger than public markets;
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(2) Minority underutilization 36 by private purchasers is more
pronounced than underutilization by government
purchasers.
3 7
Together these facts suggest that the harm caused by private discrimina-
tion is much greater than the harm caused by government discrimina-
tion. Accordingly, the allowable scope of race-conscious procurement
programs will turn importantly on the extent to which private discrimina-
tion is remediable. Because the first stylized fact-private markets are
bigger than public markets-is relatively straightforward, we establish it
briefly in the next Section, and then spend the remainder of the Part on
the second and more controversial proposition.
A. The Relative Size of Private and Public Markets
The Gross Domestic Product of the United States was roughly 12
times larger than the amount of federal, state, and local procurement put
together.38 Sales by all firms in 1987 to private businesses were over seven
36. Because the Court effectively requires a statistical disparity tojustify a numerically-
targeted affirmative action program, we do not consider more direct and localized
evidence of discrimination by government actors. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 ("evidence of
a pattern of individual discriminatory acts can, ifsupported by appropriate statistical proof,
lend support to a local government's determination that broader remedial relief is
justified") (emphasis added). In Croson, anecdotal evidence from one councilperson, see
id. at 480, and from the city manager, see id. at 500, could not compensate for the fact that
Richmond "[did] not even know how many MBE's in the relevant market [were] qualified
to undertake prime or subcontracting work in public construction projects." Id. at 502.
Nor could stronger anecdotal evidence suffice. When the Court rejected the 30 percent
Richmond target because it could not "be said to be narrowly tailored to any goal," id. at
507, it effectively required evidence of a statistical disparity to justify numerically-targeted
affirmative action, because anecdotes alone cannot provide an independent basis for
setting a goal. At least one lower court has missed this point. In dicta, the Third Circuit
suggested that "anecdotal evidence alone may, in an exceptional case, be so dominant or
pervasive that it passes muster under Croson." Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6
F.3d 990, 1003 (3d Cir. 1993). The court made this statement while determining whether
the factual predicate for a set-aside plan satisfied the compelling government interest
prong of strict scrutiny. In a later section, the court correctly listed four elements of
narrow-tailoring, the second of which was "the basis offered for the percentage selected."
Id. at 1008. By compartmentalizing its review, the Third Circuit missed a crucial point:
Anecdotal evidence of discrimination may be compelling, but it provides no basis for
selecting a percentage target for a racial preference program; it cannot satisfy the narrow-
tailoring requirement. Of course, this narrow-tailoring critique of anecdotal evidence does
not apply to an already existing program that was enacted (orjustified after enactment) on
the basis of a prior statistical disparity.
37. We limit our focus to situations in which the government participates in the
market as a purchaser, but note that the government can also participate as a seller. For
many products that rhe government sells, there are few or no competing private sellers (for
example, broadcast licenses), so the issue of private discrimination as a justification for
affirmative action in selling does not arise.
38. In 1990, government procurement was approximately $450 billion annually. See
Maria Enchautegui et al., Do Minority-Owned Businesses Get a Fair Share of Government
Contracts? 3 (The Urban Institute ed., 1996) (citing Steven Kelman, Procurement and
Public Management: The Fear of Discretion and the Quality of Government Performance
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times the size of sales to federal, state, and local governments com-
bined.3 9 Sales to private businesses overwhelm sales to the government in
every industry division.40 Because private purchasing is so much larger
than government procurement, even relatively small amounts of discrimi-
nation in the private sector can be more harmful than discrimination in
government procurement. But, as we demonstrate, there are strong rea-
sons to believe that discrimination against minority-owned enterprises is a
much larger problem in the private sector.
2 (1990) (reporting federal procurement of $200 billion plus $250 billion in state and local
procurement)). The federal component at least has remained basically constant since.
See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce Consolidated Federal Funds Report:
Fiscal Year 1996, at 3 [hereinafter CFFR] (reporting total federal procurement contract
awards of $200 billion). Byway of comparison, the total Gross Domestic Product was $5744
billion in 1990, and $7246 billion in 1995. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical
Abstract of the United States: 1996, at 445 [hereinafter Statistical Abstract].
39. See the following table:
TABLE 1. PERCENTAGE OF 1987 SALES TO CUSTOMER CATEGORIES BY INDUSTRY DMSION
Private All Not Ratio
Govt. businesses Individuals others Reported (B/A)
Industry division A B C D E F
All industries 3.3 23.7 48.7 2.6 21.7 7.2
Agricultural services* 2.0 29.7 41.1 2.7 24.4 14.5
Construction 2.6 21.5 50.9 2.2 22.8 8.3
Manufacturing 3.0 50.4 28.9 1.9 15.9 16.8
Transportation and public
utilities 3.1 29.1 25.7 3.3 38.7 9.3
Wholesale trade 3.8 53.4 27.0 3.2 12.6 14.0
Retail trade 3.4 11.7 65.0 2.4 17.5 3.5
Finance, insurance, and
real estate 1.4 14.2 63.4 2.0 19.0 10.2
Selected services 4.0 25.0 46.2 3.8 21.0 6.2
Industries not classified 3.6 24.3 41.9 4.1 26.2 6.8
Source: Figures derived from Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Characteristics of
Business Owners 8-11 tbl.1, 202-03 tbl.27a (1987) [hereinafter Census Bureau, CBO].
* Includes forestry, fishing, and mining.
This general pattern continues as we look at more refined industry segments. The ratio of
private businesses-to-government sales (Column F) ranged from 3.5 in retail trade to 16.8
in manufacturing.
40. This is not, however, equivalent to saying that in any particular market, private
purchases exceed public ones. For instance, it may be that some products are unique to
the government, like fighter planes, so that there is no demand-side substitutability
between the public and private sector. Nonetheless, producers of such products can likely
switch to private alternatives, such as commercial airplanes, and this supply-side
substitutability establishes a common public and private market for planes. The key to
defining a market is determining where competition occurs. And while we return to this
important issue later, see infra Section IV.B, it is obviously beyond the scope of this Article
to define all such relevant markets. Rather, we depend on the industry figures and the
reader's common sense to establish the prima facie case for the proposition that the
private market is generally larger than the public market.
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B. Minority Underutilization by Government and Private Purchasers
Underutilization of minority businesses is much more pronounced
in the private sector than in government procurement. Controlling statis-
tically for firm size, age, and industry, Timothy Bates has found that mi-
nority firms have significantly greater difficulty selling to private than
public purchasers.4 1 In 1987, MBEs that were "ready, willing, and able"
to sell goods and services to the government 4 2 were 22 percent less likely
to do so successfully (all else held equal) than were nonminority-owned
firms.4 3 The results for the private sector, however, were more striking:
MBEs were 55 percent less likely to sell to other businesses than were
nonminority firms.44 Bates recently updated the analysis for 1992 and
1994, and found significant progress in the public sector: In the more
recent years, MBEs were actually 33 percent more likely to sell to the gov-
ernment than were nonminority firms. 45 However, underutilization re-
mained pronounced in the private sector: MBEs were still 41 percent less
likely to sell to other businesses. 46 In short, Bates's research suggests that
private discrimination is a much larger problem than public
discrimination.
Statistics published by the Census Bureau are consistent with the
view that mino:rity underutilization is more severe in private than public
markets. Across all industries in 1987, nonminority male-owned firms
made 25 percent of their sales to private businesses, while black-owned
firms made only 12.1 percent of their sales to private businesses. 47 Con-
41. See Bates, supra note 34, at 13-20 (using the Census Bureau 1987 Characteristics
of Business Owner.s database).
42. A firm wa; considered available (i.e., "ready, willing, and able") if it had actually
sold goods or services to government clients in the past. See id. at 21. Government clients
included all units of government, from federal to local districts. See id. at 13. While this
methodology obviously derives from language in Croson, it is less generous than the
Constitution allows. We argue that availability can be adjusted upward to correct for the
effects of private discrimination against minority-owned firms. See infra Part III.
43. See id. at 23 tbl.4.
44. See id. at 29 tbl.6.
45. See Timothy Bates, Minority Business Access to Government Procurement: The
Case of Chicago 25 tbl.7 (Nov. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
46. See id. at 23 tbl.6.
47. See the following table:
TABLE 2. PERCENTAGE OF 1987 SALES TO GOVERNMENT AND OTHER BUSINESSES
Black-owned Non-minority male-owned
Private Private
Government Business Government Business
Industry division A B C D
All industries
Agricultural services*
Construction
Manufacturing
5.0 12.1
3.7 12.5
6.0 14.7
4.1 27.5
3.3 25.0
2.0 31.1
2.4 21.6
3.1 52.3
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versely, the proportion of sales to the government was slightly higher for
black-owned firms (5 percent) than for nonminority male-owned firms
(3.3 percent).48 This overall pattern held in every major division of in-
dustry. These data suggest that minority firms have a more difficult time
selling to private than to public purchasers. 49
Indeed, in large part due to the success of public affirmative action,
there is probably at present no overall minority underutilization in fed-
eral procurement. President Clinton's own 1995 review of federal affirm-
ative action reported:
Agencies first achieved the 5 percent SDB [Small Disadvantaged
Businesses] goal in 1993 and, government-wide, prime contracts
for minority-owned businesses were 6.4 percent of the total dol-
lar volume. This approaches the proportion of minority-owned
businesses among all U.S. firms .... 50
Transportation and public 5.6 18.4 3.0 30.4
utilities
Wholesale trade 5.5 30.0 3.8 54.6
Retail trade 4.0 5.0 3.6 12.3
Finance, insurance, and 3.9 5.9 1.2 15.2
real estate
Selected services 5.3 12.7 4.1 26.5
Industries not classified 3.9 11.1 3.5 25.3
Source: Figures derived from Census Bureau, CBO, supra note 39, at 202-203 tbl. 27.
* Includes forestry, fishing, and mining.
48. See Table 2, supra note 47.
49. A critic might argue that government affirmative action is responsible for this
pattern, by shifting black-owned sales out of the private and into the public sector.
However, this theory can at most account for a small portion of the disparity in private
sector sales. Recall that sales to the government were 5 percent of all sales by black-owned
firms, which is much less than the 12.9 percentage point shortfall in sales to other
businesses.
Another criticism of this conclusion is that our figures ignore sales to individuals. If
black-owned firms do comparatively well in private retail sales, one might find no overall
private underutilization. Indeed, one finds that black firms make a larger proportion of
their sales arguably to individuals: 82.9% for black firms versus 71.7% for white male firms.
See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Characteristics of Business Owners 202-03 tbl.27a (1987)
(combining sales to "individuals," "all others," and "not reported"). One possible response
to this criticism is that retail firms generally operate in different markets than wholesale
firms and firms that sell to government. In the end, however, we concede that these
summary statistics are merely suggestive, not demonstrative, of private discrimination.
50. Stephanopoulos & Edley, supra note 22, at 63. Note that SDBs must be controlled
and operated by socially and economically disadvantaged persons and do not include
businesses owned by nonminority women. See id. at 60.
Although a handful of SDBs are owned by nonminorities, there is no question that the
8(a) program is race-conscious. Economic disadvantage is relatively easy to establish. In
construction, for example, the firm size limitations make 98 percent of the businesses in
the country eligible. See Proposed Reform of the 8(a) Program Through H.R. 3994, The
Entrepreneur Dev. Act of 1996: Hearings Before the House Comm. on Small Bus., 104th
Cong., 2d Sess., 49 (1996), available in 1996 WL 528254 (F.D.C.H.) (Sept. 18, 1996), at 4
(statement of Professor George R. La Noue). The real hurdle is social disadvantage:
"Socially disadvantaged individuals are those who have been subjected to racial or ethnic
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To assess whether a 5 percent market share represents underutilization
or not, we would need to assess the availability of minority businesses.
However, one would expect the actual availability of minority-owned
firms to be below 6.4 percent, since they are, on average, smaller and
younger than nonminority firms.5 1 Accordingly, there is not strong evi-
dence that the federal government underutilizes minority-owned firms in
spending its annual 200 billion dollar procurement budget.
The picture from the department level is consistent with this impres-
sion. The Department of Defense (DoD) is by far the biggest govern-
ment spender, accounting for roughly two-thirds of all procurement.
5 2
In fiscal year 1994, 5.5 percent of all DoD prime contracting dollars were
awarded to SDBs.53 It may be argued that, due to the smaller average size
of minority-owned businesses, the appropriate analysis is limited to Small
Businesses (SBs). Of DoD prime contract dollars awarded to SBs, 24.6
percent went to SDBs. 54 Limiting the analysis to construction (which ac-
counted for $11.6 billion in DoD prime contracts), SDBs received 15.6
percent of the total dollars awarded5-5-even though minority-owned
firms in 1992 were only 9.1 percent of all construction firms.
5 6
prejudice or cultural bias because of their identities as members of groups without regard
to their individual qualities." 13 C.F.R § 124.105(a) (1998). Members of certain groups-
in general, Black Americans, Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, and Asian
Americans-are presumed to be socially disadvantaged. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.105(b) (1)
(1998). And while it is possible for nonmembers of such groups to establish social
disadvantage, see 15; C.F.R. § 124.105(c) (1998), in fact, only one-half of one percent of
SDB owners in 1994: were not in one of the presumptively eligible groups. See La Noue,
supra, at 49 ("of the 5,628 8(a) firms, 9 of them were owned by white women, 9 ... by
disabled persons and 8 ... by white males").
51. The mean receipts of minority-owned firms in 1992 were $102,747, compared to
mean receipts of $J 92,680 for all U.S. firms. See Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of
Commerce, Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises: Summary 6 tbl.C (1992)
[hereinafter Bureau of the Census, SMOBE]. It should be noted that SMOBE data are
limited to individual proprietorships, partnerships, and subchapter S corporations. We
would expect the difference to be even larger if all firms were included.
52. See CFFR, supra note 38, at 3 (reporting DoD procurement figure of $129
billion).
53. See Letter from Dep't ofJustice to Ian Ayres, Professor, The Yale Law School tbl.1
(Mar. 3, 1996) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See Bureau of the Census, SMOBE, supra note 51, at 6 tbl.C. Recall that the
SMOBE figures exclude larger corporations.
Narrowing the analysis to federal procurement by state suggests that in some markets
there may be even more significant overutilization in government procurement. In 1992,
minority-owned firms constituted only 24.9 percent of all New Mexico firms, see id. at 6
tbl.D, "and yet the Dep't of Defense ... set aside virtually all of its road-building contracts
at the White Sands military base, the largest military base in the country, for minority-
owned construction firms." Rosen, supra note 10, at 25 (describing the facts of C.S.
McCrossan Constr. Co. v. Cook, No. 95-1345-HB, 1996 WL 310298 (D.N.M. Apr. 2, 1996)
(mem.)). New Mexico is not unique: In ten states, more than 40 percent of all federal
construction contracts awarded to small businesses were awarded to SDBs. See
Stephanopoulos & Edley, supra note 22, at 66. In contrast, the minority-owned percentage
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There is stronger evidence for minority underutilization in state and
local procurement, but even here the findings are mixed, and the overall
percentage shortfalls in utilization are much smaller than in private mar-
kets. In the eight years since Croson, many states and localities have com-
piled detailed disparity studies to justify their contracting affirmative ac-
tion programs. A recent Urban Institute review of 163 disparity studies
found a "median" disparity ratio (Utilization/Availability) for all minori-
ties of 0.57, suggesting overall underutilization. 7 Setting aside method-
ological criticisms of both the underlying disparity studies and this meta-
analysis,5 8 it should be noted that 36 percent of the included studies
found either no disparity or overutilization. 59 In the construction sub-
contracting industry at issue in Croson, the Urban Institute report found
no statistically significant evidence of underutilization-the authors re-
port a median disparity ratio of 0.95, with 62 percent of the studies find-
ing either no disparity or overutilization. 60 The disparity studies suggest
that some public underutilization persists, but that there are significant
pockets of state and local contracting where no disparities exist.
In sum, Rosen's claim that "the federal government has been dis-
criminating in favor of minority contractors rather than against them"
has at least some support in the data.61 While there may still be impor-
of firms was above 40 percent in 1992 in only one state, Hawaii (where it was 52 percent).
See Bureau of the Census, SMOBE, supra note 51, at 6 tbl.D. In at least some states,
Rosen's assertion that the federal government has on net been discriminating in favor of
minorities seems to be true.
57. See Enchautegui et al., supra note 38, at tbl.II.1. The authors attached the
following interpretation to this figure: "Minority firms received only $0.57 for every one
dollar they would be expected to receive based on their availability." Id. at fig.1.
58. The biggest criticism of the underlying studies is their selected measure of
availability- "Instead of comparing the number of qualified, willing and able businesses
owned by different groups, studies have substituted headcounts based on census data or
vendor lists." La Noue Statement, supra note 12, at 43. On average, MBEs are younger
and smaller; therefore, "when disparities exist using the headcount technique, what may
be shown is that smaller businesses receive smaller contracts than large businesses, not that
MBEs are being discriminated against." Id. Courts have been receptive to this criticism.
See, e.g., Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1528
(10th Cir. 1994); O'Donnell Constr. Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 426-27
(D.C. Cir. 1992); Michigan Road Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583, 592 (6th
Cir. 1987); Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Columbus, 936 F. Supp. 1363, 1389 (S.D.
Ohio 1996). In addition to reflecting studies that utilized different and perhaps flawed
methodologies, the "median" reported by the Urban Institute study was not weighted by
the dollars awarded, so it may not be an accurate representation of the underlying studies.
A study which addressed these criticisms by limiting its analysis to one state and by
controlling for firm size and industry found statistically significant evidence of
discrimination in the awarding of government contracts in New Jersey before, during, and
after a minority set-aside program. See Samuel L. Myers, Jr. & Tsze Chan, Who Benefits
from Minority Business Set-Asides? The Case of New Jersey, 15 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt.
202 (1996).
59. See Enchautegui et al., supra note 38, at tbl.II.1.
60. See id.
61. Rosen, supra note 10, at 26.
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tant pockets of discrimination and underutilization coexisting with the
government's substantial efforts at affirmative action, this Part has tried to
show that the greater degree of discrimination in the larger private mar-
kets makes the public remediability of private discrimination a central
concern.
II. THE CAUSAL JUSTIFICATION
The remainder of this Article analyzes three ways that private dis-
crimination can justify a government affirmative action program. Even in
the absence of public underutilization of minority businesses, evidence of
private discrimination can be used to narrowly tailor a program of race-
conscious government procurement. This Part examines the case in
which government spending, directly or indirectly, causes private discrimi-
nation. But before explaining the causal justification for affirmative ac-
tion, some comments applicable to all three justifications are in order.
While our discussion will often adopt Justice O'Connor's under-
utilization approach as a core means of measuring discrimination, 62 our
thesis does not depend on any particular methodology for proving public
or private discrimination. Moreover, this Article does not address what
means should be used to enhance minority representation (e.g., quota
versus bidding credit).63 Regardless of what quantum of evidence is
deemed constitutionally sufficient to prove discrimination, and regardless
of what legal instrument is deemed an acceptable means of increasing
minority participation, our purpose is to assess what types of private dis-
crimination are constitutionally remediable. In particular, this Article
seeks to identifi which categories of private discrimination can constitu-
tionally increase the size of the government's minority utilization goal.
Unless otherwise noted, we also assume that the proposed affirmative
action programs satisfy certain prerequisites of narrow tailoring.64 The
62. See City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989) ("Where there
is a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors
willing and able to perform a particular service and the number of such contractors
actually engaged by the locality or the locality's prime contractors, an inference of
discriminatory exclusion could arise."). Elsewhere, O'Connor criticized the City of
Richmond for not knowing the percentage of total city construction dollars minority firms
received. See id. at 502. Thus, the question of whether the appropriate unit for disparity
analysis is the number of contractors or dollars was unresolved. The general approach of
disparity studies ha; been to compare "utilization," the percentage of contracting dollars
going to minority-owned firms, with "availability," the percentage of "willing and able"
firms that are minority-owned.
63. One of the authors has previously suggested that declining credit schedules will
generically be the most narrowly tailored means of effectuating affirmative action. See
Ayres, Narrow Tailcring, supra note 32, at 1808-12.
64. Narrow tailoring requires:
(1) flexibility in the form of waiver provisions;
See Croson, 488 U.S. at 508 ("Unlike the program upheld in Fullilove [v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)], the Richmond Plan's waiver system focuses solely
on the availability of MBE's; there is no inquiry into whether or not the particular
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most notable of these is the requirement that the government body
adopting the program give serious consideration to race-neutral alterna-
tives. 65 If the government could remedy private discrimination merely by
enforcing non-discrimination statutes (such as Section 1981's prohibition
of race discrimination in contracting) 66 then race-conscious government
procurement would unduly burden the interests of the disfavored nonmi-
nority contractors. 67 Assuming then the insufficiency of race-neutral al-
ternatives, we focus our attention on two core aspects of narrow tailoring:
(1) when can evidence of private discrimination provide a non-
arbitrary basis for increasing the minority utilization goal;68 and
MBE seeking a racial preference has suffered from the effects of past
discrimination by the city or prime contractors."). The plan upheld in Fullilove
"allowed for a waiver of the set-aside provision where an MBE's higher price was
not attributable to the effects of past discrimination." Croson, 488 U.S. at 508.
(2) tailored geographical scope;
In addition to insisting upon evidence of "identified discrimination in the
Richmond construction industry," the Croson Court considered it objectionable
that under Richmond's program a successful minority entrepreneur "from
anywhere in the country" enjoyed a preference. Id.
(3) limited duration, or at least provision for regular review.
In remanding Adarand, the Court instructed the lower court to consider
"whether the program was appropriately limited such that it 'will not last longer
than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate.'" Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 238 (1995) (citing Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
513 (Powell,J., concurring)). Responding tojustice Marshall's dissent, the Court
in Croson rejected the long and sordid history of racial discrimination in
Richmond as ajustification for the set-aside because it "could justify a preference
of any size or duration." 488 U.S. at 505 (emphasis added). But see infra note 221
(discussing inappropriateness of "sunset" requirements).
65. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507. This requirement is not absolute: "Croson does not
compel the county to consider every imaginable race-neutral alternative, nor to try
alternatives that would be plainly ineffective." Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 729 F.
Supp. 734, 739 (W.D. Wash. 1989).
One of the authors has criticized in particular Croson's preference for "race-neutral
policies to increase minority participation." Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, supra note 32, at 1787.
Facially, race-neutral programs-such as poverty-based subsidies-will confer benefits to
many more nonvictims than would a race-conscious program; in this sense, race-neutral
alternatives are actually less narrowly tailored to the injury they seek to remedy. See id.
66. Section 1981-as interpreted by the Supreme Court-prohibits "intentional
discrimination" on the basis of race by private parties in the formation of contracts. See 42
U.S.C. § 1981 (1994); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 171-72 (1989).
Evidence of private disparate treatment has been sufficient to show intentional
discrimination. See Ayres, Fair Driving, supra note 19, at 857-63 (discussing relationship
between disparate treatment and intentional discrimination standards).
67. It is also possible that the government would need to enforce disparate treatment
prohibitions more vigorously-for example, by devoting more investigative resources or by
granting plaintiffs punitive damages-before implementing race-conscious procurement
preferences.
68. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 507 ("[T]he 30 percent quota cannot be said to be
narrowly tailored to any goal, except perhaps outright racial balancing."). Thus, the Court
upheld the Court of Appeals's finding that "the 30 percent figure was 'chosen arbitrarily'
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(2) when would such a remedy not unduly burden innocent
third parties.
69
Croson has already clearly stated that remedying private discrimination is
a compelling government interest. This Article now proceeds to show
that evidence of private discrimination can be used to narrowly tailor
remedies that are neither arbitrary in scope nor unduly burdensome.
70
The first example is when government spending directly causes private
discrimination.
A. Direct Causation-Public Money Pays for Discrimination
The government has a compelling interest in ensuring that public
money does not directly cause private discrimination. Thus, even in the
absence of public underutilization of minority-owned prime contractors,
statistical evidence that prime contractors discriminate in the awarding of
subcontracts on public jobs is a sufficient justification for a government
affirmative action program. In this context, without an affirmative action
and was not tied to the number of minority subcontractors in Richmond or to any other
relevant number." Id. at 486.
69. See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 183 (1987) (plurality opinion) (race-
conscious decree "does not disproportionately harm the interests, or unnecessarily
trammel the rights, of innocent individuals"); cf. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 484 (opinion of
Burger, CJ.) ("It is not a constitutional defect in this program that it may disappoint the
expectations of nonminority firms. When effectuating a limited and properly tailored
remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination, such 'a sharing of the burden' by
innocent parties is not impermissible." (citation omitted)); United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (upholding voluntary affirmative action plan against Title VII
challenge in part because plan "does not unnecessary trammel the interests" of third
parties). And while it is true that the exact language "undue burdens" was only employed
in the since overruled case of Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 597 (1990),
the phrase accurately captures the focus of the Court on the effects of affirmative action
programs on nonminorities. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 276 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
("Court review can ensure that preferences are not so large as to trammel unduly upon the
opportunities of others or interfere too harshly with legitimate expectations of persons in
once-preferred groups." (citation omitted)).
70. Because the text injustice O'Connor's Croson opinion directly supports the causal
and but-for justifications, see infra Parts IIA, II.B., and III, we reserve a rigorous
examination of these two key elements of narrow tailoring for the more novel single-
market justification. See infra Part IV. We ask the reader likewise to withhold judgment
on the constitutionality of the causal and but-for theories. The narrow-tailoring arguments
for the single-market justification (e.g., the unjust enrichment principle, see infra Part
IV.B.2) support all three rationales.
We only intend to delineate when remedying private discrimination with government
affirmative action is constitutionally viable. We do not claim that the Equal Protection
Clause requires the government to use race-conscious procurement to remedy private
discrimination, although others have made analogous arguments in scholarly articles, see
Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and
the CCRI, 23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 1019 (1996) (arguing that the California Civil Rights
Initiative, a "color-blind" state constitutional initiative, is unconstitutional), and in recent
litigation in California concerning Proposition 209. See Coalition for Economic Equity v.
Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480 (N.D. Cal. 1996), rev'd, 122 F.3d 692 (9th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 397.
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plan, government spending is a but-for cause of private discrimination by
prime contractors. It would undermine the purpose of the Fourteenth
Amendment if the government could avoid its duty not to discriminate by
hiring private contractors to discriminate for it.
The Croson Court endorsed this rationale. Justice O'Connor wrote
for the majority:
[I]f the city could show that it had essentially become a "passive
participant" in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements
of the local construction industry, we think it clear that the city
could take affirmative steps to dismantle such a system. It is be-
yond dispute that any public entity, state or federal, has a compelling
interest in assuring that public dollars, drawn from the tax contribu-
tions of all citizens, do not serve to finance the evil of private prejudice.
Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465 (1973) ("Racial dis-
crimination in state-operated schools is barred by the
Constitution and [i]t is also axiomatic that a state may not in-
duce, encourage or promote private persons to accomplish what
it is constitutionally forbidden to accomplish").71
The Richmond subcontracting set-aside failed, in part, because there
was no showing of discrimination in subcontracting by prime contractors.
The decision emphasized counterfactually:
If the city of Richmond had evidence before it that nonminority
contractors were systematically excluding minority businesses
from subcontracting opportunities, it could take action to end
the discriminatory exclusion.
72
This reasoning was foreshadowed by at least one commentator,73 and
lower courts applying Croson have uniformly recognized the significance
of discrimination in the awarding of subcontracts. 74 An affirmative ac-
tion goal set at the level of subcontracting one would expect absent this
type of discrimination can clearly be a narrowly tailored response.
75
The logic of this argument suggests that the government has a com-
pelling interest in remedying discrimination by prime contractors in
purchasing not just subcontracting services but any inputs used on gov-
71. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492-93 (emphasis added) (parallel citations omitted).
72. Id. at 509.
73. See Drew S. Days, III, Fullilove, 96 Yale LJ. 453, 481 (1987) ("If, for example,
government agencies find that prime or major contractors to whom they traditionally
award contracts consistently refuse to hire minority subcontractors, reasonable grounds
exist for acting to remedy that situation.").
74. See, e.g., Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d
1513, 1529 (10th Cir. 1994); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 916, 922 (9th
Cir. 1991).
75. At least one circuit court has suggested that evidence of prime contractor
discrimination is not only sufficient but also necessary to justify a local affirmative action plan
with a subcontracting goal. See Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 91 F.3d 586, 606
(3d Cir. 1996).
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ernment jobs, labor being a prime example. 76 Indeed, Croson implied
that evidence of employment discrimination by government contractors
would have strengthened Richmond's justification for the affirmative ac-
tion program in contracting.77 The government has as compelling an
interest in not promoting employment discrimination as it does in not
causing subcontracting discrimination.
But the requirement that affirmative action plans be "narrowly tai-
lored" to further the government's "compelling interest" limits the means
that the government may employ. In particular, the government cannot
use affirmative action to increase the participation of minority prime con-
tractors as a narrowly tailored means to remedy prime contractor discrim-
ination against either minority subcontractors or minority employees.
Even though as an empirical matter, minority-owned businesses tend to
hire more minority employees than nonminority-owned businesses, 78 us-
ing affirmative action in prime contracting benefits minority prime con-
tracting firms that-at least under this theory-have not been the victims
of discrimination. 79 Furthermore, a numerically-targeted affirmative ac-
tion program in contracting cannot be a narrowly tailored response to
employment discrimination, because there is no non-arbitrary basis upon
which to set the size of the goal.
When government procurement is facilitating private discrimination
by prime contractors against minority employees or subcontractors, the
appropriate affirmative action remedy is to encourage heightened minor-
ity utilization for these particular inputs. 80 For example, evidence of per-
vasive employment discrimination by government contractors can justify
a program that requires minority employment goals for all firms receiving
government money. Such goals in employment would be narrowly tai-
lored to benefit the victims of discrimination caused by government
76. Prime contractors also often purchase a host of goods and service inputs-such as
steel, electricity, and bank loans-directly from other suppliers.
77. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 502 n.3 ("The city points to no evidence that its prime
contractors have been violating the [city race discrimination] ordinance in either their
employment or subcontracting practices.").
78. See Timothy Bates, Utilization of Minority Employees in Small Business: A
Comparison of Nonminority and Black-Owned Urban Enterprises, Rev. Black Pol. Econ.,
Summer 1994, at 113.
79. Affirmative action in prime contracting, however, does have the advantage of
burdening those prime contractors that are most likely to be discriminating against
minority employees and subcontractors. This factor explains why Croson implied that
employment discrimination would strengthen Richmond's case, even though, as the text
will demonstrate, employment discrimination alone cannot be a sufficient justification for
a narrowly tailored affirmative action program in contracting. See infra text accompanying
notes 108-109.
80. There is no doubt that withholding government money from individual firms that
use the money to discriminate is exactly tailored to the compelling government interest in
not financing the evils of private prejudice. As always, affirmative action is only
constitutional when efforts to enforce nondiscrimination laws are ineffective. See supra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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spending, and would not create an undue burden on nonminorities be-
cause the remedy merely counteracts what would otherwise be illegiti-
mate discrimination in their favor. In fact, lower courts have adopted this
approach when upholding affirmative action plans that establish percent-
age goals for the employment of minority workers on federal projects
when evidence exists that the government's money is funding contractor
employment discrimination. 8 1
B. Indirect Causation-Public Mloney Encourages Discrimination on
Private Jobs
The government has a compelling interest in ensuring that its money
does not directly cause private discrimination, but problems arise because
government spending can also indirectly cause private discrimination. Sup-
pose, for example, that the government can stop prime contractors from
discriminating against minority subcontractors on government projects,
but the same prime contractors discriminate against minority subcontrac-
tors on private jobs. Restricting the inquiry to how taxpayer dollars are
spent on government procurement projects is a naive way to determine
whether public money is "financ[ing] the evil of private prejudice."
8 2
Adding a dollar to the accounts of a discriminatory firm may indi-
rectly induce the firm to discriminate on other contracts. Most recipients
of public contracts also have nongovernmental sources of revenue,8 3 so
when the government gives public money to discriminatory firms, it frees
more of that private money to be spent in a discriminatory manner by the
recipient firms. In economic terms, public money covers part of the
fixed costs of discriminatory firms, thereby increasing their ability to dis-
criminate in subcontracting on private jobs. Prime contractors savvy
enough to refrain from discriminating on public jobs may be buoyed by
public money, and be able to discriminate more on privatejobs as a result
of government dollars received. In this sense, government spending can
indirectly cause private discrimination.
8 4
81. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159, 174-75 (3d Cir.
1971);Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284, 1290 (D.N.J. 1970).
82. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492-93.
83. See Bates, supra note 34, at 15 tbl.2 (74 percent of nonminority firms and 63
percent of minority firms with sales to the government in 1987 also sold to private firms).
84. Government expenditures to discriminatory firms might indirectly cause these
firms to discriminate not just as buyers of inputs, but as sellers as well. For example, a
contractor buoyed by government revenues may find it easier to discriminate against
minority buyers of its product. The more money it gets from the government, the more
this contractor can afford to discriminate against minority buyers.
The government can certainly withhold money from firms guilty of discriminating
against minority buyers, but even pervasive evidence of this practice probably cannot justify
a government affirmative action program. The appropriate affirmative action remedy as a
conceptual matter would be to require firms receiving government contracts to sell a
certain proportion of their goods to minority firms. Yet as discussed below, it is likely to be
impossible to determine how much of such private discrimination is caused by government
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Croson's reliance on Norwood v. Harrison85 suggests that the Supreme
Court would find that the government has a compelling interest in reme-
dying the effects of private discrimination indirectly caused by govern-
ment procurement.86 Quoting Norwood, Croson emphasized:
[I] t is also axiomatic that a state may not induce, encourage or
promote private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally
forbidden to accomplish.
87
Norwood held that Mississippi's policy of providing textbooks to private
schools that excluded blacks violated the Equal Protection Clause. By
analogy, awarding contracts to firms that discriminate privately is "induc-
ing, encouraging or promoting" discrimination.
88
In remanding a post-Croson case, the Tenth Circuit implicitly
adopted the indirect causal rationale as a compelling government inter-
est.89 To justify its subcontracting affirmative action plan, the City of
Denver offered evidence of combined public and private sector under-
utilization of minority subcontractors. 90 The court accepted this evi-
dence as probative of prime contractor discrimination, and suggested
that evidence of "an exact linkage between [the municipality's] award of
public contracts and private discrimination" would "at least enhance" the
City'sfactual predicate for its program. 91 Such evidence might show that
"Denver indirectly contributed to private discrimination by awarding pub-
lic contracts to firms that in turn discriminated against MBE and/or WBE
subcontractors in other private portions of their business."92 The court con-
procurement, so that as a practical matter it will be extremely difficult to produce a non-
arbitrary goal.
85. 413 U.S. 455 (1973).
86. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492.
87. Id. at 492--93 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Norwood,
413 U.S. at 465).
88. The analogy breaks down somewhat at the remedy stage. The private schools in
Norwood were openly discriminatory, so the appropriate remedy was to stop giving
textbooks to these schools. The direct parallel in government contracting would be
withholding government contracts from individual firms that have been identified as
discriminating privately in awarding subcontracts (i.e., not affirmative action). The
problem here, of course, is in identifying the individual firms guilty of discrimination. The
argument against affirmative action based on statistical evidence of affirmative action must
be that some innocent firms will be burdened along with the guilty. But this criticism
applies with equal force to the direct causal rationale, which the Croson Court explicitly
endorsed; it is an argument against affirmative action generally, not against this particular
rationale. In order to support the indirect causal justification, the reasoning of Norwood
must be combined with Croson's approval of statistical evidence of discrimination as
sufficient tojustify affirmative action. The combination suggests that statistical evidence of
subcontracting discrimination by nonminority primes can justify the government shifting
its resources away from nonminority firms.
89. See Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513,
1522, 1529 (10th Cir. 1994).
90. See id. at 1525-29.
91. Id. at 1529.
92. Id. (emphasis added).
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trasted this situation to one in which "the private discrimination was prac-
ticed by firms who did not receive any public contracts."9 3 In short, evi-
dence of subcontracting discrimination on private jobs by prime
contractors who receive government money can support a public sector
affirmative action plan.
9 4
Ultimately, the problem with this indirect causation theory is "nar-
row tailoring."95 It is exceedingly difficult to estimate how much of a
government contractor's discrimination on nongovernment jobs results
from government money. Even though the government has a compelling
interest in remedying private discrimination which its purchasing has in-
directly caused, we are skeptical that the government can provide a non-
arbitrary basis for the size of such a remedy. Fortunately (at least for
supporters of affirmative action), the government's interest in remedying
private discrimination is not limited to private discrimination that it has
either directly or indirectly caused, so the inability to prove that the gov-
ernment caused private discrimination need not constrain the scope of
an affirmative action remedy.
II. THE BUT-FOR JUSTIFICATION
The most widely accepted example of using government affirmative
action to eliminate the effects of private discrimination that the govern-
ment has not itself caused concerns what is commonly referred to as "but
for" adjustments to utilization goals. 96 Justice O'Connor's analysis in
93. Id. The court left open the possibility that purely private discrimination, without
contribution from the government, could justify a public affirmative action program. See
infra Part IV.
94. Language from a Ninth Circuit decision is consistent with this rationale: "Mere
infusion of tax dollars into a discriminatory industry may be sufficient governmental
involvement to satisfy [the compelling interest] prong [of strict scrutiny]." Coral Constr.
Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 916 (9th Cir. 1991). The court cited the "passive
participant" language from Croson in support of this proposition, but did not provide any
additional analysis.
95. The form of the affirmative action relief is relatively uncontroversial-the
government could respond to prime contractor discrimination against minority
subcontractors on nongovernmental projects by requiring government contractors
generally to increase their utilization of minority subcontractors (on government projects,
nongovernment projects, or both).
96. The Justice Department adheres to this interpretation: "Each industry
benchmark limitation will represent the level of minority contracting that one would
reasonably expect to find in a market absent discrimination or its effects." Proposed
Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 26,042, 26,045 (1996).
The benchmark would then be adjusted upward to reflect "the estimated effect of race in
suppressing minority business activity." Id. at 26,046. This essentially adopts the position
of Drew Days:
[T]he [set-aside percentage] should initially correspond to the percentage of
minority contractors within the jurisdiction who are qualified and available to
participate in government projects. These percentages might then be increased,
if findings of discrimination support it, to reflect the number of minority
entrepreneurs who were deterred in the past from entering the contracting
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Croson suggests that the government's utilization goal or benchmark
should be the percentage of available ("willing and able") firms that are
minority-owned businesses. 97 But-for analysis uses evidence of private dis-
crimination to show that the raw availability percentage understates what
true minority availability would be but for private discrimination. 98 When
private discrimination against minority businesses has reduced their ca-
pacity to win government contracts, the government should be able to
adjust the scope of the affirmative action remedy to set a utilization goal
for government purchases equal to the utilization percentage that the
government would have purchased in the absence of discrimination. 99
The government's compelling interest in making this kind of but-for
correction to eliminate the effects of private discrimination on govern-
ment purchasing is strongly supported by Croson's analysis of discrimina-
tion by private contractor associations. When a private association refuses
to accredit minority contractors, the government is a "passive participant"
in the private discrimination if it uses this private accreditation as an eligi-
bility criterion for bidders on government contracts:
[If the local contractors' association excluded minority firms
from membership,] the city would have a compelling interest in
preventing its tax dollars from assisting these organizations in
maintaining a racially segregated construction market. See ...
Ohio Contractors [Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167,] 171 [6th Cir.
1983] (upholding minority set-aside based in part on earlier
District Court finding that "the state had become 'ajoint partici-
pant' with private industry and certain craft unions in a pattern
business because of racial barriers, but who are likely to take advantage of the
remedial program.
Days, supra note 73, at 484.
The Third Circuit has recognized that "[t]he small number [of certain minority-
owned construction businesses] itself may reflect barriers to entry caused in part by
discrimination." Contractors Ass'n v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1008 (3d Cir. 1993).
The court upheld an affirmative action plan for businesses owned by Blacks against a
summary judgment motion, but enjoined the program as applied to Hispanics and Asians
due to a lack of concrete evidence of discrimination against these groups. See id.
97. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509 (1989).
98. Just as private discrimination may have suppressed minority availability, public
affirmative action may have increased it. A sensitive but-for correction would take both
effects into account. But this problem of determining what true minority availability would
be but for both discrimination and affirmative action also affects traditional attempts to
remedy public discrimination. Our point is that whatever methodology is sufficient to
determine minority availability with regard to remedying public discrimination should
suffice to determine minority availability with regard to remedying private discrimination.
99. A possible objection to this argument would be that different firms sell in the
public and private markets. There are two responses to this objection: (1) it is empirically
false, see supra nole 83; and (2) even if it were true in some market, the relevant inquiry is
whether the firms would have had the capacity to sell to both public and private buyers in
the absence of discrimination, not whether they actually do so.
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of racially discriminatory conduct which excluded black laborers
from work on public construction contracts").100
Even though the government has not caused the private discrimination, if
the government does not adjust its eligibility criteria it would-possibly
unwittingly-"assist these organizations" in excluding minority firms
from the market place. 1 1 Croson suggests that the government should
treat as available those minority firms that would have been accredited
but for private discrimination.
10 2
Justice O'Connor's approving citation to Ohio Contractors'0 3 is partic-
ularly relevant: When private discrimination by employers and unions
has made it more difficult for black laborers to be employed on govern-
ment jobs, government affirmative action can ensure that the govern-
ment is no longer a 'joint participant" in excluding minority workers
from public construction projects. When unions exclude minority labor-
ers, the government should reject union membership as an eligibility re-
quirement for working on government jobs. Instead, the government
should treat as available those minority laborers who would have been
union members but for the union's private discrimination.
10 4
This but-for availability adjustment can be applied more generally to
remedy other types of discrimination by input suppliers to minority busi-
nesses. For example, if the suppliers of steel or credit discriminate
against minority businesses, then the minority businesses will have higher
100. Croson, 488 U.S. at 503-04 (citation omitted); cf. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,
433 (1984) ("Private biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly
or indirectly, give them effect.").
101. One might analogize the private accreditation of contractors' associations to the
accrediting function served by administrators of the LSAT (or other standardized tests). A
private organization accredits prospective students before they are accepted into state law
schools. The LSAT has a disparate impact on black and Hispanic applicants to law schools.
See Linda F. Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis
of the Consequences of Abandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admission Decisions,
72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 20 tbl.3 (1997) (reporting lower LSAT means for nonwhite ethnic
groups). Disparate impact is not sufficient to show an Equal Protection violation, see
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), so use of the LSAT is probably not
unconstitutional. But see Daria Roithmayr, Deconstructing the Distinction Between Bias
and Merit, 85 Cal. L. Rev. 1449, 1486-91 (1997) (arguing that the rise of testing was
motivated in part by discriminatory intent). In either case, statistical evidence of disparate
impact, like underutilization, may suffice to justify an affinmative action program.
102. Requiring one entity to take into account discrimination by another entity at an
earlier point in time is not a new concept. In effect, Title VII requires private employers to
consider the effects of public discrimination in education. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1971) (holding that an employer must demonstrate that high school
completion and aptitude test scores are related to job performance, even though the
disparate impact of such criteria resulted from inferior, segregated public education).
103. See supra text accompanying note 100.
104. As discussed supra notes 78-81 and accompanying text, the form of the remedy
in Ohio Contractors-setting aside construction contracts for minority businesses, as
opposed to mandating higher minority employment on such projects-was not narrowly
tailored to remedy the type of private discrimination at issue. See Ohio Contractors Ass'n
v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983).
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production costs. If the government then relies primarily on low-price
bidding competitions to award public contracts, the government will be
assisting the private discriminators "in maintaining a racially segregated
... market'U 5 just as much as if it relied on the accreditation of discrimi-
natory private contractors' associations.1 06 The appropriate response is
for the government to treat as available all minority contractors who
would have been able to compete effectively for government contracts in
the absence of the private discrimination.
10 7
The major impediment to a but-for availability correction is produc-
ing an adjustment that is both non-arbitrary and not unduly burdensome.
Croson, for example, rejected generalized assertions that past societal dis-
crimination in education and employment had impeded minority entre-
preneurship, because such assertions provided "no guidance for a legisla-
tive body to determine the precise scope of the injury it seeks to
remedy."' 0 8 The question becomes, what types of private discrimination
can be used to make a narrowly tailored but-for adjustment?
105. Croson, 488 U.S. at 503.
106. There is, however, a danger that using but-for adjustments to counteract the
effects of upstream private discrimination will also have the effect of creating more
opportunities for upstream discrimination. (Upstream discrimination is defined infra Part
IV.B.) Any program that confers a competitive advantage to minority-owned contractors
may increase private sellers' ability to discriminate. Suppose a hardware store charges its
black customers 10 percent more for supplies than its white customers, and the customers
are all firms buying supplies to fill government contracts. An affirmative action program
puts relatively more money in the hands of black customers, who may therefore be able to
afford an even higher discriminatory mark-up. In response, the hardware store may
increase the level of price-discrimination to, say, 20 percent. In this example, it can be said
that affirmative action, not race-neutral procurement, causes additional private
discrimination. This possibility does not mean, however, that public affirmative action
cannot make progress in counteracting the effects of private discrimination. Remedying
the effects of private discrimination is still a compelling governmental interest even when
the remedy is not effective in eliminating the private discrimination itself. See id. at
491-92.
107. Private downstream discrimination (by the private purchasers that buy from
minority businesses) might also reduce the availability of minority businesses. If there are
"learning curve effects" or a "minimum efficient scale" of production, then discrimination
by private buyers might also result in higher production costs when minority businesses bid
on government contracts. For basic descriptions of elements of industrial economics, see
F.M. Scherer & David Ross, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance (3d
ed. 1990).
108. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498. However, O'Connor made it clear that a state or local
entity could take "action to rectify the effects of identified discrimination within its
jurisdiction." Id. at 509 (emphasis added).
There is some language in Croson suggesting a rejection of the assumptions underlying
all statistical evidence of discrimination. O'Connor dismissed extremely low MBE
membership in local contractors' associations as by itself not probative of discrimination:
"There are numerous explanations for this dearth of minority participation, including past
societal discrimination in education and economic opportunities as well as both black and
white career and entrepreneurial choices. Blacks may be disproportionately attracted to
industries other than construction." Id. at 503 (citation omitted). Statistical evidence of
racial discrimination can always be countered by such "cultural" explanations for observed
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At a minimum, we believe that the government should be able to
make but-for availability adjustments to counteract the effects of private
discrimination against the minority businesses qua minority businesses.
Under this theory, private discrimination against potential minority en-
trepreneurs would not provide a valid basis for a but-for adjustment. This
distinction suggests that but-for adjustments should not be used to esti-
mate how many more minority firms would exist but for private discrimi-
nation, but should be limited to estimating how much more available ex-
isting firms would be-in terms of capacity or ability to charge a lower
price-in the absence of private discrimination. Distinguishing discrimi-
nation against minority firms and potential minority entrepreneurs is
consonant with the examples discussed in Croson: But-for adjustments to
counteract private discrimination which excluded existing minority-
owned businesses from professional trade associations would be constitu-
tional, but adjustments to counteract private discrimination in education
or employment markets against potential minority entrepreneurs would not
be.1
0 9
Using the but-for adjustment to counteract discrimination only
against existing minority businesses is justified by the narrow tailoring re-
quirements that remedies be neither arbitrary nor unduly burdensome.
It is much more difficult to come up with a non-arbitrary basis for the size
of an adjustment to include minority individuals who would have begun
minority businesses but for discrimination.' 1 0 In effect, one would need
disparities, so this logic is potentially crippling for antidiscrimination plaintiffs and
affirmative action supporters alike. Significantly, O'Connor made these statements in the
course of dismissing a single statistic-MBE membership in local trade associations. She
immediately proceeded to note that a comparison of this figure with the proportion of
eligible contracting firms owned by minorities could be probative. See id.
Nonetheless, this passage and the broader discussion of "societal discrimination" have
led many commentators to read Croson as much less tolerant of affirmative action than we
argue careful analysis reveals the opinion to be. For instance, Reva Siegel uses the "societal
discrimination" language of Croson to argue that
today doctrines of heightened scrutiny function primarily to constrain legislatures
from adopting policies designed to reduce race and gender stratification, while
doctrines of discriminatory purpose offer only weak constraints on the forms of
facially neutral state action that continue to perpetuate the racial and gender
stratification of American society.
Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-
Enforcing State Action, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 1111, 1143 (1997). Both these assertions may be
true, but they ignore the "passive participant" and "private discrimination" passages in
Croson which specifically address the facially neutral state action with which Siegel is
concerned.
109. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 503. Statistical evidence of discrimination against
potential entrepreneurs may, however, justify an affirmative action program in
employment or any earlier stage at which evidence of discrimination exists, even if the
connection to procurement is too attenuated to support a non-arbitrary procurement goal.
See infra Part V.
110. [T]he figure . . . is metaphysical, not empirical, and no state has
convincingly calculated it. In Texas, for example, the state tried to suggest that
low percentages of self-employed minorities, and high percentages of
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to estimate two different linkages: First, one would have to predict how
many of these individuals would have begun businesses, and, second,
then go on to predict how many of these businesses would have been
qualified-in the sense of having been ready, willing, and able-to do
business with the government. The more temporally remote the private
discrimination against potential entrepreneurs, the harder it will be to
estimate this first link of how many more minority businesses would exist.
Restricting the but-for adjustment to counteracting discrimination
against existing firms only requires estimating the second link-how
much more available existing minority firms would have been in the ab-
sence of discrimination-and thus affords a more precise and less arbi-
trary basis for adjustment.
To date, most discussions of but-for adjustments have centered on
the wrong question: But for discrimination against potential minority entre-
preneurs, how many more minority businesses would exist?"' The far
more relevant question is: But for private discrimination against existing
minority businesses, how much more available would these firms be? Private
upstream discrimination" 2 can inhibit the ability of minority firms to
compete solely on the basis of price. Even minority firms that have not
been able to compete successfully for government contracts should be
deemed available under this theory if the government can establish that
but for private discrimination by input suppliers they would be ready, will-
ing, and able. But-for adjustments thus may be necessary to ensure that
the government does not become a passive participant in the private
discrimination.
discrimination lawsuits filed, might indicate that minority business formation had
been suppressed by discrimination. But the General Services Administration
refused to accept the claim, conceding that business formation may be affected by
cultural factors or personal choices that have nothing to do with discrimination.
Rosen Testimony, supra note 12, at 209. Rosen may be overstating his critique. For
examples of sophisticated but-for analyses in the New York state construction market, see
Hyman Frankel, Opportunity Denied! New York State's Study of Racial and Sexual
Discrimination Related to Government Contracting, 26 Urb. Law. 413, 429-33 (1994).
And even critics of ihe but-for adjustment recognize that legislative bodies are not required
to produce rigorous scientific proof. See George R. LaNoue & John Sullivan, "But For"
Discrimination: How Many Minority-Owned Businesses Would There Be?, 24 Colum.
Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 93, 99 (1992-93) (recognizing the distinction between the standards of
social science and "[t]hejudicial requirement.., that the studies in general be 'thorough
and impartial'"). More sympathetic commentators argue that the goal of avoiding
undercorrection for discrimination should be balanced against empirical uncertainty. See
Paul Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition: School Desegregation and the Corrective Ideal, 86
Colum. L. Rev. 728, 788-89 (1986) ("To limit or reject the corrective conception because
of empirical problems in precisely tracing out causal links is to turn the very extensiveness
and duration of wrongs into an excuse for doing nothing about them.").
111. Although La Noue and Sullivan describe studies that consider the effects of
discrimination on both existing and would-be firms, the title focuses on the latter: "How
Many Minority Businesses Would There Be?" La Noue & Sullivan, supra note 110.
112. The concepts of upstream and downstream discrimination are defined and more
fully discussed infra Part IV.B.
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It might be possible to go slightly further back in time in making a
non-arbitrary but-for adjustment. For example, looking at the class of
qualified potential entrepreneurs, it might be possible to estimate statisti-
cally how many more minorities would have started businesses but for
private discrimination against the class of qualified potential minority en-
trepreneurs. This approach would not attempt to remedy discrimination
that disabled minorities from gaining basic qualifications (such as a col-
lege degree), but would look only at differences in minority business cre-
ation given basic qualifications. As recently implemented by Timothy
Bates," 53 this approach employs multivariate regression analysis to esti-
mate how much less likely it is for a 30-year-old with an M.B.A. and
$50,000 to start a business if she is African American, for example.
114
This statistical approach for calculating the percentage of missing minor-
ity businesses takes potential entrepreneurs as it finds them, commences
the inquiry at the point that they would decide to begin a business, and
excludes the effects of past discrimination that might have led minorities
to have less wealth, education, or work experience. 115 While this ap-
proach holds the prospect of providing non-arbitrary estimates for but-for
adjustments, its limited focus has, not surprisingly, led to rather modest
adjustments of the utilization target (on the order of one or two percent-
age points).116
113. See Timothy Bates, Self-Employment Entry Across Industry Groups, 10 J. Bus.
Venturing 143, 148 (1995) (in a logistic regression which controlled for education, wealth,
age, experience, marital status, and sex, the minority variable was a statistically significant
predictor of self-employment entry in each industry group analyzed). For another
multivariate analysis that likewise found significant ethnic and racial differences in self-
employment, see Robert W. Fairlie 8- Bruce D. Meyer, The Ethnic and Racial Character of
Self-Employment (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 4791, 1994).
114. Multiple regression analysis is a far cry from the single statistic (low MBE
membership in local contractors' associations) which the Court dismissed as not probative
of discrimination because it could be explained in part by "both black and white career
and entrepreneurial choices." Croson, 488 U.S. at 503. One could also argue that
O'Connor's opinion tacitly accepts the but-for rationale by defining availability in terms of
the number of minority contractors qualified for government jobs, instead of the minority
share of total do!lars awarded. Because minority firms are, on average, smaller than
nonminority firms, see supra notes 51 & 58, it is natural to expect their average contract to
be of a lower dollar amount. To the degree that discrimination has contributed to this
smaller firm size, the utilization/availability comparison endorsed by O'Connor implicitly
corrects for this discrimination. But for discriminatory impediments to firm development,
the average dollar amount of minority firms' contracts would be greater. However,
O'Connor also stressed that only firms that are "qualified . . . willing and able" be
considered available, Croson, 488 U.S. at 509, and some lower courts have required
disparities to be corrected for differences in firm size. See, e.g., Engineering Contractors
Ass'n v. Metropolitan Dade County, 943 F. Supp. 1546, 1573, 1576 (S.D. Fla. 1996), aff'd,
122 F.3d 895, 923-24 (11th Cir. 1997).
115. This approach is also consonant with our single-market justification, discussed
infra Part IV, in that discrimination in the past or in other markets is not used to define the
scope of the remedy.
116. See Bates, supra note 113, at 154-55. Consonant with this approach, we could
imagine some types of employment or union discrimination that could be the basis of a
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Regardless of where the courts demarcate the limits of "identifiable"
private discrimination for the purposes of a but-for adjustment, it is clear
that any non-arbitrary estimate of how much more available minority
firms would have been in the absence of private discrimination does not
unduly burden nonminority contractors. Nonminority businesses that
are disadvantaged by the but-for adjustment in competing for a small pro-
portion of government purchases are not "unduly burdened" because the
but-for adjustment merely aims to counteract what would otherwise be
the unjust benefits these firms would receive because of private discrimi-
nation. If the government is purchasing less from the minority firms only
because of private discrimination, then nonminority firms are not bur-
dened by a but-for adjustment that reduces their market share of pro-
curement down to what it would have been in the absence of discrimina-
tion. To the extent that nonminority firms would have been unjustly en-
riched by private discrimination-in the sense that they would have re-
ceived more government contracts than they would have in the absence
of private discrimination-they are not unconstitutionally burdened by
an affirmative action program that reduces their unjust enrichment.
IV. THE SINGLE-MARKETJUSTIFICATION
The causal and but-for justifications both require a nexus between
private discrimination and public spending. The causal theory turns on
public spending causing private discrimination; the but-for justification
turns on private discrimination causing otherwise neutral public purchas-
ing criteria to have a discriminatory effect. In the absence of affirmative
action, either of these causal relationships would make the government a
"passive participant" in the private discrimination. But the Croson deci-
sion did not limit the government's ability to remedy private discrimina-
tion to situations where its action or inaction would cause discriminatory
effects.
Justice O'Connor's use of the phrase "passive participant" under-
scores the idea that the government can constitutionally remedy private
discrimination even when there has not been the type of state action that
would trigger the Equal Protection Clause. When inaction ("passive,"
color-blind behavior) would tend to maintain racially segregated markets,
the government has a compelling interest to counteract this effect. The
government's constitutional ability to correct discrimination that it has
not caused might include remedies to correct underutilization of minor-
ity firms in private markets. Under this broad interpretation, the govern-
but-for availability adjustment. For example, imagine that a particular type of
subcontractor firm was almost exclusively created by a group of experienced craftspeople.
If discrimination by unions or private employers keeps otherwise qualified minority
workers from getting this last bit of requisite experience, we can imagine that it would be
possible to calculate a non-arbitrary estimate of how many additional minority
subcontracting firms would exist but for this private discrimination.
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ment would be a "passive participant" in private discrimination whenever
its inaction left intact the effects of identifiable private discrimination.
This Part argues that purely private discrimination can justify a gov-
ernment affirmative action program in the same market. Eradicating the
effects of private discrimination is a compelling governmental interest,
and, where nonminority sellers have been unjustly enriched by private
discrimination, a government affirmative action program does not im-
pose an undue burden. Defining the relevant market is obviously critical
to this justification, so principles of market analysis developed in the anti-
trust context may be instructive. Because the private market for a given
product is generally so much larger than the public market, the single-
market justification can countenance a 100 percent minority procure-
ment goal. Such an absolute goal would create unconstitutional "expres-
sive harm," so we offer two more moderate alternatives.
A. Purely Private Discrimination as a Compelling Governmental Interest
Remedying purely private discrimination is a compelling governmen-
tal interest. The Fourth Circuit in Croson had interpreted Wygant to re-
quire "prior discrimination by the government unit involved."117 And Justice
O'Connor's own concurring opinion in Wygant concluded that "a govem-
mental agency's interest in remedying 'societal' discrimination, that is,
discrimination not traceable to its own actions, cannot be deemed suffi-
ciently compelling to pass constitutional muster under strict scrutiny."" 8
But Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson explicitly distinguished Wygant
twice in rejecting this narrow interpretation. Because so many courts and
commentators continue to believe that the government can remedy only
its own discrimination, we quote the relevant language of Croson at
length:
It would seem equally clear, however, that a state... has the au-
thority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own
legislative jurisdiction. This authority must, of course, be exer-
cised within the constraints of § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Our decision in Wygant is not to the contrary. Wy-
gant addressed the constitutionality of the use of racial quotas by
local school authorities pursuant to an agreement reached with
the local teachers' union. It was in the context of addressing the
school board's power to adopt a race-based layoff program af-
fecting its own work force that the Wygant plurality indicated
that the Equal Protection Clause required "some showing of
prior discrimination by the government unit involved." Wygant,
467 U.S., at 274. As a matter of state law, the city of Richmond
has legislative authority over its procurement policies, and can
use its spending powers to remedy private discrimination, if it identifies
117. J. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1358 (4th Cir. 1987)
(quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality opinion)
(internal quotation marks omitted)), aft'd, 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
118. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 288 (concurring opinion).
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that discrimination with the particularity required by the Fourteenth
Amendment. To this extent, on the question of the city's compe-
tence, the Court of Appeals erred in following Wygant by rote in
a case involving a state entity which has state-law authority to
address discriminatory practices within local commerce under
its jurisdiction."19
The crucial issue after Croson then is not whether the government has
discriminated or even whether the government is a passive participant in
private discrimination; it instead, is whether private discrimination has
been identified "with the particularity required by the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 2 0 This language suggests that the government has a com-
pelling interest in remedying private discrimination even where there is
no causal nexus between public spending and private discrimination.'
2 1
119. Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-92 (1989) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Karst
synopsized this language as follows:
In one respect, Croson extends the range of permissible state and local
government affirmative action beyond Wygant. The Fourth Circuit . . .had
applied Wygant literally, holding that a city could use affirmative action in
contracting only for the purpose of remedying its own past discrimination.
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White, rejected
this limitation, making clear that the city can accept its share of the public
responsibility for remedying private discrimination, using its spending powers to
remedy discrimination in the local construction industry.
Kenneth L. Karst, Private Discrimination and Public Responsibility: Patterson in Context,
1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1, 44. In Justice O'Connor's Croson opinion, the adjective "societal"
changes from meaning "not governmental" to meaning "not identified." See 488 U.S. at
497 ("[In Wygant] justice Powell, writing for the plurality, .. . drew the distinction between
'societal discrimination' which is an inadequate basis for race-conscious classifications, and
the type of identified discrimination that can support and define the scope of race-based
relief." (emphasis added)). (We say "changes" advisedly since a careful reading of Wygant
suggests that the former interpretation was never valid. See infra text accompanying notes
122-125.)
120. Putting the issue this way raises the question of whether the causal and but-for
justifications actually point to types of private discrimination that can be identified with the
required specificity.. While government surely has a more compelling interest in
remedying discrimination that its own policies have caused, the presence of government
causation may not assist the government in estimating more precise utilization targets.
Even worse, but-for corrections add imprecision to utilization goals without the
countervailing super-compelling interest.
121. The single-market rationale is supported by analogy to Commerce Clause
doctrine, which holds that a state can do more as a market participant than it can do as a
nonparticipant. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The Court has upheld state policies
discriminating against out-of-staters when the state is a "market participant," as opposed to
a "market regulator." See Reeves Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980) (cement market);
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) (abandoned automobile market).
Of course, the importance in this context of the participant-regulator distinction derives
from the specific language of the Commerce Clause ("[tio regulate").
Under antitrus: law, the government actually has less latitude as a market participant
than it has as a regulator- Government regulation of the marketplace, even when it clearly
restrains trade, is upheld, whereas government participation in private combinations to
restrain trade is generally struck down. In upholding a raisin marketing program adopted
by the State of California, the Court noted that "we have no question of the state or its
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Properly understood, the holding in Wygant actually supports our ar-
gument that private discrimination canjustify government affirmative ac-
ion in the same market. In Wygant, the Jackson Board of Education at-
tempted to justify its affirmative action program in hiring school
teachers-not on the basis of its own prior employment discrimination-
but as an attempt to remedy societal discrimination by providing "role
models" for minority schoolchildren. 12 2 For a plurality of the Court, the
crucial defect of the role model theory was that it did "not necessarily
bear a relationship to the harm caused by prior discriminatory hiring
practices." 123 In contrast, evidence of discrimination "by the governmen-
tal unit involved" would have ensured a narrow tailoring of both the ben-
efits and burdens of affirmative action.' 24 Limiting affirmative action to
the "government unit involved" helps assure that (1) the minority benefi-
ciaries of the affirmative action are the same class of people who were
victims of the government's discrimination and (2) the nonminorities
now burdened by affirmative action are the same class of people who
were previously unjustly enriched by the government's prior discrimina-
tion. Significantly, there was no claim of private employment discrimina-
tion against teachers inJackson. Thus, Wygant is not a rejection of private
discrimination as a sufficient rationale for public affirmative action;
rather, it stands for the proposition that the benefits and burdens of a
race-conscious remedial program must be sufficiently tailored. To ac-
complish this, racial preferences need not be restricted to the "govern-
mental unit involved" in discrimination; rather, the Constitution should
only require that we restrict public affirmative action to the "same market
involved" in the discrimination. As with Wygant's restriction, limiting gov-
ernment's affirmative action to the "same market involved" in private dis-
crimination ensures a double nexus between those who benefit and those
who were harmed and between those are burdened and those who were
unjustly enriched. Justice O'Connor was quite right in Croson to empha-
size that nothing in Wygant diminishes the government's compelling in-
terest in remedying private discrimination.125
The government's broad power to remedy private discrimination was
foreshadowed one year prior to Croson, in New York State Club Ass'n v. City
municipality becoming a participant in a private agreement or combination by others for
restraint of trade." Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943).
122. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 271-73.
123. Id. at 276.
124. In a sense, our single-market justification is narrower than Wygant. Following
Wygant, discrimination by the school board in hiringjanitors mayjustify the race-conscious
hiring of teachers. We would reject such slippage between distinct segments of the labor
market. Like the role model theory, the "by the governmental unit involved" requirement
does not necessarily ensure a tight fit between remedy and injury; the single-market
rationale does better.
125. The compelling interest of the federal government in remedying private racial
discrimination is augmented by Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment and Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. See supra note 12.
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of New York.' 26 The Supreme Court upheld a city law prohibiting discrim-
ination by private clubs, recognizing "the State's 'compelling interest' in
combating invidious discrimination."1 27 Because her opinion is so often
decisive in affirmative action cases, the statements ofJustice O'Connor on
this issue are worth emphasizing. In her concurrence to New York,
O'Connor labeled "profoundly important" the goal of ensuring nondis-
criminatory access to private commercial opportunities. 128 This opinion
reinforces the notion that the government has a compelling interest even
in remedying private discrimination that it has not caused.
129
B. Narrowly Tailoring the Single-Market Just ication
Recognizing the government's compelling interest in remedying pri-
vate discrimination, narrow tailoring becomes the crucial prong of strict
scrutiny. Subject to the constraints we outline in this Part, a government
affirmative action program can be a narrowly tailored response to private
discrimination in the same market.
Private discrimination against minority firms can take two forms,
which we term upstream and downstream discrimination. Upstream dis-
crimination exists when suppliers of inputs charge higher prices to or
refuse to deal with minority firms, thereby raising the cost of production.
Downstream discrimination exists when buyers offer lower prices to or
refuse to deal with minority firms. Either upstream or downstream dis-
crimination cart reduce the private sales of minority firms and upstream
discrimination can reduce the sales of minority firms to the government.
126. 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
127. Id. at 14 n.5 (citation omitted).
128. Id. at 18 (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 632 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (internal quotations
marks omitted)). Elsewhere, O'Connor has suggested that the difference between an
"important" and "compelling" goal may be "negligible." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286.
129. Several lower courts have followed suit by implicitly or explicitly recognizing this
governmental interest. In Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and County of Denver, discussed
at supra text accompanying notes 89-94, the Tenth Circuit noted that Croson did not
"requir[e] the municipality to identify an exact linkage between its award of public
contracts and private discrimination." 36 F.3d 1513, 1529 (10th Cir. 1994). The court
considered probative a racial disparity in the overall Denver MSA construction market, i.e.,
combined public and private sector utilization of MBEs and WBEs. See id. Similarly, the
Ninth Circuit has quoted at length affidavits of private discrimination by buyers in
considering whether the government had provided sufficient evidence of a compelling
interest. See, e.g., Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 918 (9th Cir. 1991) ("'I
believe the refusal of prime contractors, developers and architects to award contracts to my
business for private sector work is due to discrimination against minority persons and
minority-owned businesses generally.'" (quoting testimony of Barbara H. Pool, president
of Seaway Construction, Inc.)). A Connecticut district court put the point directly: "By
producing evidence that MBEs and WBEs attempted to win private contracts and were
systematically rejected despite their bids having been the lowest, the city might have shown
that discrimination exists and, thus, that the need for a set-aside existed." Associated Gen.
Contractors v. City of New Haven, 791 F. Supp. 941, 947 (D. Conn. 1992) (emphasis
added), vacated as moot, 41 F.3d 62 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Consistent with the narrow tailoring requirement, the government
can use affirmative action in procurement for particular goods to favor
minority firms when private upstream or downstream discrimination has
reduced minority sales of similar goods to private buyers. Thus, the gov-
ernment, when buying pencils, could advantage minority bidders upon
showing that minority pencil sales to private buyers had been depressed
by upstream or downstream discrimination.
30
This theory contains two core limiting principles. The government
can provide a race-conscious remedy for private underutilization of mi-
nority businesses:
(1) only to counter the effects of private upstream or down-
stream discrimination against the minority businesses qua minor-
ity businesses; and
(2) only to the extent that the remedy burdens those who as a
group have unjustly benefitted from private discrimination.
These limiting principles assure that the scope of the remedy is neither
arbitrary nor unduly burdensome. This Part discusses these limiting prin-
ciples in turn to demonstrate how adhering to each allows the govern-
ment to narrowly tailor an affirmative action program.
1. The Existing Business Principle. - As argued in our discussion of
but-for corrections, limiting the single-market rationale to discrimination
against minority firms themselves (instead of remedying discrimination
against potential minority entrepreneurs) is more likely to produce non-
arbitrary estimates for affirmative action goals. While the Supreme Court
has rejected generalized claims of past discrimination that "provide[ ] no
guidance for a legislative body to determine the precise scope of the in-
jury it seeks to remedy,"' 3 ' estimating the impact of private discrimina-
tion on the minority market share in a particular industry provides a
"non-arbitrary basis" for selecting a utilization target. Thus, whatever type
of statistical disparity analysis that is sufficient to prove public discrimina-
tion should be sufficient when applied to private data to provide a non-
arbitrary estimate of the magnitude of private discrimination. For exam-
ple, the same underutilization analysis that was suggested by Justice
O'Connor in Croson with regard to government procurement can be ap-
plied to private purchases of the same products to determine whether
there is a shortfall in minority participation.' 3 2
Statistical evidence of private upstream or downstream discrimina-
tion against minority enterprises in a particular industry can provide a
130. Downstream discrimination by private buyers could directly reduce minority
sales; upstream discrimination by input suppliers could indirectly reduce minority sales by
increasing minority firms' costs of producing pencils.
131. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 498 (1989).
132. Again, while several commentators have criticized the Croson underutilization
approach, our point is that whatever method one uses to determine a nonarbitrary amount
to remedy the government shortfall in minority purchases could be applied equally well to
determine an amount to remedy the private shortfall. See supra note 32.
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basis for a narrowly tailored government goal: recreating the minority
market share one would expect absent private discrimination.' 3 3 Estimat-
ing the minority-owned business market share in a world without private
discrimination provides a non-arbitrary basis for the percentage selected
as a goal for the program. In contrast to the situation in Richmond
where "the 309o quota [could not] be said to be narrowly tailored to any
goal,"13 4 the single-market justification produces a goal that corresponds
exactly to the government's authority to "eradicate the effects of private
discrimination."
135
2. The Unjust Enrichment Principle. - The second core limitation
might be characterized as an "unjust enrichment" principle. While the
harms of racial discrimination are evident, we often overlook the fact that
racial discrimination against minorities in the marketplace also necessar-
ily unjustly enriches the nonminorities who benefit because of their
race.136 Translated into the terms of disparity analysis, a statistical find-
ing that minority firms are underutilized necessarily implies that nonmi-
nority firms are being overutilized.
Nonminority businesses that are disadvantaged by affirmative action
in competing for a proportion of government purchases are not "unduly
burdened" if the government can show that they were unjustly enriched
by the private discrimination that the government is trying to remedy. As
Chief Justice Burger argued in Fullilove:
[A] lthough we may assume that the complaining parties are in-
nocent of any discriminatory conduct, it was within congres-
sional power to act on the assumption that in the past some
nonminority businesses may have reaped competitive benefit
over the years from the virtual exclusion of minority firms from
these contracting opportunities.
3 7
133. The single-market rationale may also apply at the subcontracting level if prime
contractors in an exclusively public prime contracting market buy from the same
subcontracting market as private prime contractors. Here, the government could institute
a subcontracting affirmative action plan to correct for discrimination by private prime
contractors.
134. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507.
135. Id. at 491-92.
136. This unjust enrichment may not always take the form of increased profits. A
sufficient degree of competition among nonminority suppliers may drive their economic
profits to zero even though they are being overutilized. Conversely, however, in such a
market affirmative action will not reduce their profits, so the unjust enrichment argument
is unnecessary for narrow tailoring. A broader conception of the relevant burdens and
benefits would include the raw number of contracts won on the theory that participation
has value independent of business profits. See infra note 170. Under this conception,
both the undue burden and unjust enrichment arguments would apply even to zero-profit
suppliers.
137. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484-85 (1980) (plurality opinion of Burger,
CJ.); accord Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713 F.2d 167, 173 (6th Cir. 1983) ("Even if it
is assumed that the plaintiffs in this action are innocent of discriminatory conduct
themselves, they are part of a group which did reap competitive benefit from past
discriminatory practices .. ").
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When the government produces statistical* evidence of nonminority
overutilization, affirmative action is predicated on more than an assump-
tion of unjust enrichment. The minority preferences in government pro-
curement merely seek to eliminate nonminority overutilization-to re-
duce the nonminority market share to what it would be absent private
discrimination. 138 Thus, reducing an unjust enrichment is not an uncon-
stitutional burden.
139
138. As one of us has stated previously, "focusing the burden of procurement
affirmative action on incumbent nonminority firms might be a narrower tailoring of the
burdens to the class of people who have benefitted from past discrimination (than
distributing burdens among the general population)." Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, supra
note 32, at 1789 n.25. It should be noted, however, that the Court in Bakke and in the Title
VII cases reviewing affirmative action seemed to favor a broad distribution. See id.
If the Court chooses to adhere rigidly to this approach, it could nonetheless accept
the single-market rationale, but require monetary damages to compensate nonminority
firms for lost profits attributable to affirmative action. See McAleer v. AT&T, 416 F. Supp.
435, 440-41 (D.D.C. 1976) (awarding damages to a male employee who would have been
promoted but for an affirmative action plan favoring women); see also Setser v. Novack
Inv. Co., 638 F.2d 1137, 1145 n.20 (8th Cir. 1981) (following McAleer); cf. W.R. Grace & Co.
v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757 (1983) (sustaining an arbitrator's award in favor of male
employees who were laid off because an affirmative action plan suspended the regular
seniority system). But see Dennison v. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water and Power, 658
F.2d 694, 696 n.1 (9th Cir. 1981) (rejecting McAleer).
139. The burden on nonbeneficiaries of an affirmative action plan in contracting may
be perceived by the Court to be relatively light if it does not interfere with settled,
legitimate expectations. In this respect, procurement is more like hiring than like layoffs.
"While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of several
opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on particular
individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. That burden is too
intrusive." Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 (1986) (plurality opinion of
Powell, J.) (footnote omitted); see also Croson, 488 U.S. at 549 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(quoting Wygant); cf. Local 28 of the Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. EEOC, 478 U.S.
421, 479 (1986) (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.) (upholding a judicially-ordered
affirmative action plan against a Title VII challenge in part because the order "did not
require any member of the union to be laid off, and did not discriminate against existing
union members").
This distinction is consistent with the tendency to perceive direct losses as more
painful than foregone gains. The intuition dates back at least as far as Aristotle, see The
Nicomachean Ethics 49 (David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press rev. ed. 1992), but Amos
Tversky and Danny Kalneman were the first to formalize the theory of loss aversion. See
Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk,
47 Econometrica 263 (1979); see also Jack L. Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and
Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves, 79 Am. Econ. Rev. 1277 (1989). For an
application of loss aversion to the affirmative action context, see Fredrick E. Vars, Attitudes
Toward Affirmative Action: Paradox or Paradigm?, in Carol M. Swain, Race Versus Class:
The New Affirmative Action Debate (1996). Winning a particular contract in the past may
create an expectation of winning it again in the future, see Cortez III Serv. Corp. v. NASA,
950 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D.D.C. 1996), but this entitlement is less firmly-rooted than a
permanent employment contract by virtue of the fact that government contracts are
regularly reopened for competitive bidding. And, of course, no one is deprived of an
endowment when affirmative action is applied to a new government contract.
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The unjust enrichmeni principle suggests that the government can-
not use affirmative action in one market to remedy private discrimination
in another. The crucial test is whether the nonminority firms disadvan-
taged by a remedial program in a particular market have benefitted from
private discrimination in the form of increased private sales. Under our
theory, the government could not use its pencil procurement to remedy
private discrimination against minority suppliers of other products.
Thus, private discrimination that reduced the minority provision of con-
struction services could not justify government affirmative action in pen-
cil procurement. The nonminority pencil producers were not unjustly
enriched by private discrimination in the construction industry and
hence would be unduly burdened by the minority preference in pencil
procurement.
In assessing whether remedying private discrimination unduly bur-
dens nonminority firms, courts should analyze combined public and pri-
vate purchases to see whether the government affirmative action does
more than counteract private overutilization of nonminority firms. The
unjust enrichment principle suggests that so long as affirmative action
does not create nonminority underutilization, nonminorities are not un-
duly burdened by the government's racial preferences in procurement.
Justice Powell explicitly applied just this combined-market approach
in Fullilove to assess whether nonminority construction firms were unduly
burdened by a federal statute setting aside 10 percent of federal highway
contracts for minority firms. Applying strict scrutiny in his concurrence,
Powell concluded that a minority preference leaving "96% of contractors"
free "to compete for 99.75% of construction funds" was not a "burden...
so great that the set-aside must be disapproved." 140 Citing the same statis-
tic, the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Burger held that the "actual
'burden' shouldered by nonminority firms [was] relatively light ... as
compared with overall construction contracting opportunities." 141 Since
the government's affirmative action plan would still leave nonminority
contractors overutilized, the nonminority contractors are not unduly
burdened.
It is of crucial importance that Powell and Burger chose the com-
bined market oF private and public purchases as the appropriate unit of
140. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 514-15 (Powell, J., concurring).
141. Id. at 484:. Although the plurality opinion did not adopt the tiers of scrutiny
approach, see id. al 492, it noted that the Fullilove program "would survive judicial review
under either 'test' articulated in the several [Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978)] opinions," id., one of which was, of course, Justice Powell's
strict scrutiny.
Justice Marshall, in his dissent to Croson, noted that: "Like the federal provision [in
Fullilove], Richmond's has a minimal impact on innocent third parties. While the measure
affects 30% of public contracting dollars, that translates to only 3% of overall Richmond
area contracting." Croson, 488 U.S. at 548-49 (citations omitted). The Justices in the
Croson majority did not mention the slight effect on third parties, perhaps because they
found a host of other constitutional defects.
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analysis. Their opinions did not merely look at the percentage of federal
purchases for which nonminorities could compete (90 percent), but at
the percentage of public and private purchases for which nonminority
firms could compete (99.75 percent). Looking at the government mar-
ket alone, the 10 percent set-aside would cause nonminority firms to be
underutilized-as 96 percent of contracting firms who were nonminority
were free to compete for only 90 percent of these federal contracting
jobs. However, Powell and the Burger plurality rejected this approach.
By focusing on the continuing overutilization of nonminority firms in the
combined public and private markets, the Court implicitly accepted the
unjust enrichment principle. Nonminority firms were not unduly bur-
dened by the 10 percent set-aside, because these same firms were still
unjustly garnering a disproportionate share of the overall market.
C. Market Definition
To apply the unjust enrichment principle, it is necessary to define
the relevant markets and to assess the competitive impact of both private
discrimination and government affirmative action. An over-broad defini-
tion of the market would resemble the "societal" discrimination rationale,
emphatically rejected by Croson, and could unduly burden nonminority
firms in sub-markets where there is no private discrimination in their
favor. For example, if private buyers discriminate against minority electri-
cians, but not against minority plumbers, a government affirmative action
plan that encompassed both electrical and plumbing procurement 42
would unduly burden nonminority plumbers.
For the single-market rationale to be viable, it is essential that the
public affirmative action take place in the same market as the private dis-
crimination. A set of minority and nonminority firms must compete for
both public sales (affected by affirmative action) and private sales (af-
fected by private discrimination). The single-market rationale allows the
government to make up for the lost sales caused by private upstream or
downstream discrimination by purchasing more of the same product
from minority sellers (than it would purchase absent private
discrimination).
Principles of antitrust market analysis can be usefully applied to de-
termine what constitutes the same product for affirmative action pur-
poses.' 43 The objective in defining the relevant line of commerce for
antitrust purposes is "to recognize competition where, in fact, competi-
tion exists."'144 Most obviously, when the goods that a set of producers
sell to public and private purchasers have homogeneous attributes (or are
142. This is assuming no supply or demand substitutability. See infra text
accompanying notes 144-148.
143. Such application, however, should not be mechanical. See infra notes 148-155
and accompanying text.
144. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 326 (1962); see also Ian Ayres,
Note, Rationalizing Antitrust Cluster Markets, 95 Yale L.J. 109, 109 n.1 (1985) ("Because
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close demand substitutes), it is appropriate to place them in the same
market under the single-market rationale. Our earlier discussion of pen-
cils is apposite. There is both a private and public demand for pencils,
and (assuming private overutilization of nonminority producers) the gov-
ernment could increase its minority purchasing without burdening
nonminority sellers.
However, as recognized in antitrust law, supply substitutability consti-
tutes an independent rationale for placing non-homogeneous products
in the same market. 145 The basic idea is that if producers can shift be-
tween two different products at a low cost, those products belong in the
same market. For example, if manufacturers can switch easily between
making left-handed and right-handed guitars, both types of guitars, be-
long in the same market. This is true even though only ambidextrous
musicians could substitute one product for the other; that is, there is no
demand substitutability.
The products involved in Croson and Adarand illuminate the issues of
market definition. The J.A. Croson Company lost a project to install
stainless steel urinals and toilets in the city jail because it did not meet the
Richmond minority subcontracting goal.146 If private buyers of identical
plumbing fixtures discriminate against minority sellers, an affirmative ac-
tion plan could be designed to achieve the minority market share one
would expect absent private discrimination. Estimating the size of the
preference would be relatively straightforward, and the overutilization of
nonminority sellers in the private sector would minimize the burden of
the program. A harder question concerns whether ceramic urinals and
toilets should be included in the same market. If we assume that steel
and ceramic urinals are not supply substitutes, the question becomes the
degree to which ceramic and steel toilets compete for private demand. If
the two types of products have a relatively high cross-price elasticity of
demand-i.e., a small decline in the relative price of steel could induce a
substantial portion of private ceramic buyers to switch to steel fixtures-
then a sensible market definition would include both types of plumbing
fixtures. If ceramic and steel manufacturers compete for private and
public demand, then using affirmative action to increase minority sales of
steel urinals to the government would not unduly burden nonminority
manufacturers who could look to a larger private market demand for ce-
ramic and steel.
In contrast to Croson, the facts of Adarand highlight issues of supply-
side substitution. A nonminority firm, Adarand Constructors, Inc., did
not receive a subcontract to install guardrails on a federal project despite
having submitted the lowest bid. Instead, the contract went to a minority
substitutes compete, substitutability in demand or supply has been the prime criterion for
setting the boundaries of a market.").
145. See Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325 n.42 ("cross-elasticity of production facilities
may also be an important factor in defining a product market").
146. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 481-83.
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firm because of an affirmative action program.147 Unlike plumbing fix-
tures, guardrails are purchased almost exclusively by the government, so
there is no demand substitutability. This does not, however, end our in-
quiry. It is possible that guardrail suppliers can shift their production to
supply alternative construction services. If this were the case, the alterna-
tive construction services would be supply substitutes and the relevant
market should include them. The government would be justified in us-
ing affirmative action in guardrail procurement to counteract minority
underutilization in the general contracting industry. Nonminority guard-
rail suppliers who were disadvantaged in competing for government con-
tracts would not be unduly burdened if the government could show that
they could compete for (and had an unjust advantage in competing for)
a variety of private non-guardrail construction jobs. If, however, as a fac-
tual matter guardrails are not a demand or supply substitute with any
other privately demanded product, then the single-market justification
would not apply-the government could not use guardrail affirmative ac-
tion to remedy private discrimination.
While the concepts of demand and supply substitutability are help-
ful, they do not answer the question of what level of specificity is required
to define a market. Opponents of affirmative action might set the stan-
dard so high that only perfect demand substitutes could be lumped to-
gether in a particular market. (Taken to its extreme, the result could
approximate Justice Scalia's position that the state can remedy only indi-
vidual discriminatory acts. 148) In the antitrust context, the Justice
Department guidelines envision a product-by-product review.149 Given
the fact that the federal government spends roughly $200 billion annually
in procurement of tens of thousands of different products and services,
requiring legislative or executive bodies to conduct analysis at this level of
detail would be prohibitively burdensome.
The Justice Department has decided to define industries according
to two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for the purpose
of establishing minority contracting benchmarks. 150 The Department
justified this decision on the ground that existing data would not support
147. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 205 (1995).
148. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 524-27 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). O'Connor
does not go this far. In her view, prima facie statistical evidence of discrimination can
suffice to justify race-conscious public policy. See id. at 509.
Level-of-specificity problems are unavoidable. For instance, O'Connor's discussion of
a hypothetical Aleut newcomer suggests that evidence of discrimination in the relevant
market against a particular minority group is required for inclusion of that group among
the beneficiary class. See id. at 506. Consideration of the boundaries among minority
groups is obviously beyond the scope of this Article, but we do attempt to add
sophistication to O'Connor's market analysis.
149. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552, 41,554 (1992) ("The
Agency will first define the relevant product market with respect to each of the products of
each of the merging firms.").
150. See Response to Comments to Department of Justice Proposed Reforms to
Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 62 Fed. Reg. 25,648, 25,650 (1997).
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estimates at the four-digit level, but left open the possibility of more re-
fined analysis in the future if better data permitted it.'51 A closely related
issue is the geographical boundaries of a market. 152 The Justice
Department proposes to start from the premise that federal contracting is
conducted in a national market but to set the benchmarks on a regional
basis where the data indicate that an industry operates regionally.
155
While not as refined as some antitrust analyses, we believe that this SIC
approach captures empirically sufficient "competitive reality" to' assess
whether nonminority firms are unduly burdened by affirmative action. If
the Court is sincere in its assertion that strict scrutiny is not "strict in
theory, but fatal in fact,"' 54 it cannot require more validation than can be
practicably estimated. 155
D. The 100 Percent Problem
The single-market rationale is so potent ajustification that it might at
times justify a :00 percent minority government contracting goal. This
possibility presents itself whenever the size of the minority shortfall in the
private sector is equal to or exceeds total government spending in that
market. 156 In the Introduction, we suggested that the DoD might have to
151. See id.
152. Recall that the Court objected to the lack of geographical limits on the
Richmond plan in Croson. See supra note 64.
153. See Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action in Federal Procurement, 61 Fed.
Reg. 26,042, 26,045 (1996).
154. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (quoting Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment)).
155. Cf. Gewirtz, supra note 110 (arguing that the costs of uncertainty should not be
borne by the historical victims of discrimination).
In evaluating the adequacy of environmental impact statements, courts tolerate
incomplete information even when better data are expected. See Alaska v. Andrus, 580
F.2d 465, 473-74 (D.C. Cir.), vacated in nonpertinent part sub nom. Western Oil & Gas
Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978).
Where [the] cost [of proceeding without more and better information] has been
considered, and where the responsible decisionmaker has decided that it is
outweighed by the benefits of proceeding with the project without further delay,
the courts may not substitute their judgment for that of the decisionmaker and
insist that the project be delayed while more information is sought.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
156. One way to avoid the 100 percent problem is to increase total government
purchases in a particular market. Like providing direct payments to nonminority sellers
disadvantaged by affirmative action, see supra note 138, increasing government spending
would have the effect of shifting the burden of the affirmative action program from the
nonminority seller; in the relevant market to taxpayers generally. In some markets,
expanding government purchasing could eliminate completely the burden on
nonminority sellers. The burden on the public fisc of such a policy, however substantial, is
of lesser constitutional weight than the goal of remedying private discrimination. As a
policy matter, expanding government purchasing may not be totally implausible given
congressional willingness to buy and destroy surplus agricultural products. Taken to an
extreme, however, increased government spending to remedy private discrimination-
buying and throwing away vast quantities of minority-produced cheese, for instance-may
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direct 100 percent of its prime construction contracts to minority firms to
correct for private sector underutilization. 157 The facts of Fullilove pro-
vide another example. Justice Powell's concurrence found that
[a 10 percent government] set-aside would reserve about 0.25%
of all the funds expended yearly on construction work in the
United States for approximately 4% of the Nation's contractors
who are members of a minority group. The set-aside would have
no effect on the ability of the remaining 96% of contractors to
compete for 99.75% of construction funds.158
But if a 10 percent set-aside would reserve only 0.25 percent, then a 100
percent set-aside would have reserved only 2.5 percent of the overall-
combined public and private-construction market. The disfavored
nonminority contractors under the unjust enrichment principle might
not be unduly burdened by even a 100 percent government set-aside, be-
cause these 96 percent of contractors would still be able to compete for
97.5 percent of total construction funds. 159 Thus, sufficient private un-
derutilization of minority contractors in a market where private
purchases are much larger than public sales could lead to a 100 percent
minority construction goal. In this Section, we explore whether there is
something uniquely objectionable about a 100 percent affirmative action
goal.
Federal courts have already shown a hostility toward 100 percent
goals. For example, in Carter v. Gallagher, the Eighth Circuit struck down
a district court order requiring the Minneapolis Fire Department to fill
100 percent of its next twenty positions with eligible minority appli-
cants. 160 The court rejected this "absolute preference," but suggested
that a one-to-two hiring ratio (33 percent goal) would be appropriate. 161
create a constitutionally objectionable "expressive harm." See infra text accompanying
note 171.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
158. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 514 (Powell, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
159. The combined market analysis in Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City and
County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513 (10th Cir. 1994), provides another example. Minority
availability was approximately 5.8 percent, see id. at 1525 (17.4 percent [utilization] + 3
[estimated disparity index] = 5.8 percent [availability]), so the combined public and
private disparity index of 0.43 for 1990, see id. at 1529, implies an overall minority
utilization rate of 2.5 percent. Because the relevant public construction programs
represented approximately 2 percent of all construction in the Denver metropolitan area,
see id., directing 100 percent of public spending to minority firms would (at a maximum)
increase overall utilization to 4.5 percent, still short of the 5.8 percent one would expect
absent discrimination.
160. 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971) (en banc).
161. Id. at 324, 331. The closest the court came to articulating ajustification for the
distinction between a 100 percent and 33 percent goal was the following: "[A] hiring
remedy based on an alternating ratio such as we here suggest will by no means necessarily
result in hiring less qualified minority persons in preference to more qualified white
persons." Id. (emphasis added). This statement is true, but the same could be said of an
absolute preference. If the next twenty most qualified applicants are all minorities, a 100
percent hiring goal merely ensures that the best applicants are in fact hired. Conversely, a
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And in United States v. Paradise, three sitting Supreme Court Justices criti-
cized a 50 percent promotion goal on the explicit ground that it could
not be distinguished from a 100 percent quota.162 Faced with a long his-
tory of recalcitrance on the part of the Alabama Department of Public
Safety to integrate the ranks of its state troopers, a federal district court
ordered a temporary one-to-one promotion plan. Justice Brennan, for a
plurality of the Court, concluded that the requirement did "not dispro-
portionately harm the interests, or unnecessarily trammel the rights, of
innocent individuals," because "it only postpone[d] the promotions of
qualified whites."1 63 In a dissent joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia, Justice O'Connor argued:
Such a justification, however, necessarily eviscerates any notion
of "narrowly tailored" because it has no stopping point; even a
100% quota could be defended on the ground that it merely
"determined how quickly the Department progressed toward"
some goal.... [P] rotection of the rights of nonminority workers
demands that a racial goal not substantially exceed the percentage of
minority group members in the relevant population or work force ab-
sent compelling justification. 64
Thus, the dissenters' objection to the 100 percent goal was derived from
concern for "the rights of nonminorit[ies]."
However, ihe combined market figures from Fullilove and the unjust
enrichment principle more generally suggest that the rights of nonmi-
norities need not be unduly burdened by a high government affirmative
action goal-if there are private alternatives for which the nonminorities
strict one-to-two mandate will result in the hiring of a less qualified minority person any
time three white applicants in a row are more qualified than the best minority applicant.
Decided in 1971, Carter preceded the Supreme Court's landmark affirmative action
decisions, so it is perhaps understandable that the Eighth Circuit in effect limited
affirmative action to the role of a prophylactic against future discrimination. But to the
extent affirmative action also seeks to eradicate the effects of past discrimination, a goal
the Supreme Couxt has time and again endorsed, some preference for equally or lesser
qualified minorities is appropriate. If there is a unique constitutional defect to a 100
percent affirmative action goal, Carter did not identify it.
162. 480 U.S. 149, 198-99 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 185, (plurality opinion of Brennan, J.). Justice Powell made essentially the
same point in his concurrence: "Although some white troopers will have their promotions
delayed, it is uncertain whether any individual trooper, white or black, would have
achieved a different rank, or would have achieved it at a different time, but for the
promotion requirement." Id. at 189 (Powell, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens cast the fifth vote to uphold the plan. The key for Stevens was the
discretionary power of a district judge to fashion an equitable remedy in response to a
proven constitutional violation. See id. at 193-94 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).
Stevens suggested more rigorous review of affirmative action adopted by legislative bodies,
but minimized the burden on white officers in terms consistent with our "unjust
enrichment" argument: "Inevitably, promotions of the white officers who have been
beneficiaries of the past illegal conduct may be delayed even though they are 'innocent
victims' in the sense that they are not individually responsible for the past illegal conduct."
Id. at 193 n.2.
164. Id. at 199 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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can compete. Indeed, a narrow way to read the Paradise dissent to make
it consistent with the foregoing is to focus on the possibility that the
nonminorities who were denied promotion were not as a class unjustly
enriched by private discrimination in favor of nonminority police.
165
Such conditions are much different from the procurement context,
where private buyers may overutilize the same nonminorities disadvan-
taged by public affirmative action.' 66 In the procurement context, even a
100 percent minority utilization goal may have very little effect on the
total size of nonminority firms' opportunities. 167  And, properly
designed, a corrective affirmative action program would (at most) reduce
the nonminority combined market share to the level one would expect
absent private buyer discrimination.
Justice O'Connor thus could still maintain that a racial goal cannot
"substantially exceed the percentage of minority group members in the
relevant population" but conclude that when sellers compete for both
government and private buyers, the relevant population should be a com-
bined public and private market. In the Fullilove context, preferring mi-
nority-owned firms on 100 percent of government contracts might ac-
cordingly be seen as just a 2.5 percent utilization goal in the combined
public and private market (for the 4 percent of construction firms that
are owned by minorities).168
Nonetheless, even if a 100 percent minority goal is non-arbitrary and
does not unduly burden non-beneficiaries, we believe it is unconstitu-
tional.169 Strict scrutiny of race-conscious decisionmaking implies an ad-
ditional criterion for constitutionality. 170 A government goal of 100 per-
165. The State of Alabama is clearly a monopsonist with respect to Alabama state
troopers. In other words, there is no demand substitutability for troopers. With the
massive increase in private policing services, see Welcome to the New World of Private
Security, Economist, Apr. 19, 1997, at 21, there may be some degree of supply
substitutability, but the possibility of nonminorities switching to a competitive private job at
the time of promotion might be de minimis. If so, a 100 percent minority promotion goal
forecloses 100 percent of nonminority opportunities in the relevant market.
166. The procurement context is also distinguishable from employment in that
minority-owned firms may include nonminorities. Even a 100 percent minority set-aside
allows substantial nonminority participation. Nonminorities "may participate by having up
to 49% ownership or control of a minority establishment, by taking up to 50%
participation in ajoint venture with a minority contractor and by bidding successfully for
subcontracts awarded by minority prime contractors." Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Keip, 713
F.2d 167, 174 (6th Cir. 1983).
167. See supra notes 157-159 and accompanying text.
168. See supra notes 158-159 and accompanying text.
169. We emphasize that we focus on the constitutionality of the goal itself, not the
means by which the government seeks to achieve it. Thus a 100 percent goal does not
necessitate a quota or set-aside which as a means might be independently objectionable.
We instead are concerned with whether narrowly tailored means-such as a declining
schedule of bidding credits, see Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, supra note 32-to effectuate a
100 percent goal could be constitutional.
170. The Supreme Court has held that nonminority contractors have standing to
challenge an affirmative action program because such a program creates "a barrier that
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cent minority utilization may be constitutionally objectionable because
such action creates an "expressive harm." As described by Richard Pildes
and Richard Niemi:
An expressive harm is one that results from the ideas or atti-
tudes expressed through a governmental action, rather than
from the more tangible or material consequences the action
brings about.... Public policies can violate the Constitution not
only because they bring about concrete costs, but because the
very meaning they convey demonstrates inappropriate respect
for relevant public values.
17'
The concept was originally applied to race-conscious redistricting to ex-
plain the Court's antipathy for bizarrely shaped districts:
[R] eapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter
... because, even apart from any concrete harm to individual
voters, such appearances themselves express a value structure
that offends constitutional principles.172
The Supreme Court has increasingly embraced this notion of "expressive
harms," most recently in Bush v. Vera.173
Even though we stand by our prior analysis in arguing that a 100
percent minority goal need not unduly burden nonminority firms in
terms of "concrete costs" (if the government shows that these firms are
being overutilized when competing for private sales),174 an independent
makes it more difficult for members of one group to obtain a benefit than it is for
members of another group." Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen.
Contractors v. City of'Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993). Plaintiffs are not required to
show that a nonminority firm would have won a contract but for the affirmative action
program. See id. The loss of opportunities to compete for contracts is recognized as a
constitutional harm, independent from the loss of particular contracts. It would seem to
follow that the inquiry into undue burden must extend beyond the actual loss of contracts
to the magnitude of the barrier itself. A 100 percent contracting goal may be an undue
burden because by appearing to exclude nonminorities it imposes a barrier of
unconstitutional magnitude, quite apart from its actual effect on contracts won and lost.
Thus, the "expressive harm" discussed in the text below could be conceptualized as an
undue burden, not an additional criterion for constitutionality. We do not think this
conceptual choice significantly affects the analysis that follows.
171. Richard F. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich. L.
Rev. 483, 506-07 (1.993).
172. Id. at 509 (footnote omitted).
173. 517 U.S. 952, 1053 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (summarizing majority
opinion); see also id. at 984 (majority opinion). In this case, the Court struck down three
congressional voting districts in Texas as not narrowly tailored because they were bizarrely
shaped and noncompact.
174. If sellers catalogue public and private sales of a particular item in separate
"mental accounts," they may not perceive them as interchangeable. See Richard H.
Thaler, Anomalies: Saving, Fungibility, and Mental Accounts,J. Econ. Persp., Winter 1990,
at 193. Thus, the psychological injury of losing all pencil sales to the government may be
pronounced, even when private pencil sales are booming. A similar problem of
conceptual severance arises in applying the diminution-in-value test in Takings
jurisprudence. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 419 (1922) (Brandeis,
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limitation of "expressive harms" can explain why the extreme (and
facially bizarre) scope of a 100 percent goal offends constitutional
principles. 17
5
Excluding nonminorities from public contracting creates a new kind
of racial segregation. The Croson Court expressed concern with more
than the economic costs of discrimination to minority contractors-it
suggested that the government had an interest in dismantling "a racially
segregated construction market."1 76 But a procurement goal of 100 per-
cent minority utilization seeks to do just this with regard to the sub-mar-
ket of government purchasing. When the government's goal is not to
contract with the nonminority vendors in a particular market, the govern-
ment's impulse to remedy private discrimination is no longer in tension
with, but has completely trumped, the long-run constitutional aspiration
of race-blind decisionmaking. 177 Pildes and Niemi have argued that such
eclipsing race-consciousness in the redistricting context sends a constitu-
tionally impermissible message:
Government cannot redistrict in a way that conveys the social
impression that race consciousness has overridden all other, tra-
ditionally relevant redistricting values. In the Court's view, cer-
tain districts whose appearance is exceptionally "bizarre" and "ir-
regular" suggest that impression. Plaintiffs need not establish
that they suffer material harm, in the sense of vote dilution,
from such a district. Shaw is fundamentally concerned *iith ex-
pressive harms: the social messages government conveys when
race concerns appear to submerge all other legitimate redistrict-
ing values.' 7
8
While the remedial impulse is compelling, expressive harm theory sug-
gests that it cannot be transcendent. A 100 percent goal sends the
message that the government is willing to "balkanize the races by encour-
aging their segregation" 79 and to foreclose one form of contact (that is
J., dissenting). This psychological harm to nonminorities does not, however, deserve the
same constitutional weight as the very real economic injury private buyer discrimination
inflicts on minority sellers. Ultimately, for-profit firms are interested not in competing for
contracts in particular sub-markets, but in winning contracts in the overall marketplace.
Rather, as we discuss in the text, the constitutional problem derives from the fact that
people would infer expressive meaning from minority-only participation in the
government "account."
175. Voting is the central legitimating process of a democratic system. For this
reason, it may be more important to avoid expressive harms in redistricting than in
government spending. Thus, "expressive harm" theory, as developed in voting district
cases, may not apply with the same force in the context of government procurement.
176. City of Richmond v. JA.A Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989).
177. This aspiration is distinct from the popular rhetoric of color-blindness, which
ignores current patterns of racial subordination. The expressive harm limitation falls well
short of mandating race-neutrality; rather, it excludes only remedies that contribute more
to the disease of discrinination than to the cure.
178. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 171, at 526-27.
179. Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1745, 1749
(1996).
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the relationship of contractual privity) that a class of citizens can have
with its government. Because of these additional harms, the Fourteenth
Amendment should not countenance a 100 percent goal.
What then? If 100 percent is too much, how can the government
formulate a non-arbitrary goal that-a. la Croson-seeks to remedy private
discrimination?' 80 Under the single-marketjustification, is there any util-
ization goal between the traditional availability target' 81 (set to remedy
only public discrimination) and the 100 percent objective that will with-
stand strict scrutiny? We believe there is. At a minimum, the government
should be able to engage in what we call "proportional overutilization" to
remedy private underutilization. If governmental purchases account for
X percent of the overall (combined public and private) market, we pro-
pose that the government should at least be able to remedy X percent of
the overall shortfall in minority utilization. For example, imagine that:
(1) The government purchases 20 percent of all widgets; (2) minority
businesses have 10 percent of all widget capacity; and (3) absent affirma-
tive action, the government would purchase 10 percent of its widgets
from minority firms (i.e., no public underutilization), but because of ra-
cial discrimination, private buyers would purchase only 5 percent of their
widgets from minority firms. These assumptions imply that, absent af-
firmative action, minority-owned firms would supply only 6 percent of the
overall market, representing a gross underutilization of 4 percentage
points. 182 Our proportional overutilization standard would allow the gov-
ernment to set a minority utilization target of 14 percent, which is 4 per-
centage points above the assumed overall minority availability of 10 per-
cent. This proportional overutilization standard ties the scope of the
remedy to the government's relative position in the overall market. If
government purchases represent 20 percent of the overall market, the
government can try to remedy 20 percent of the overall minority under-
utilization. If (notwithstanding the prohibition against private racial dis-
crimination) the private market can get away with a 4 percentage point
underutilization, the public market (notwithstanding the undue burden
180. This narrow-tailoring problem does not arise in the redistricting context. For
while Shaw and its progeny prohibit "bizarreness," there is no requirement that the
nonbizarre district shapes be tailored to produce a nonarbitrary goal. Shaw v. Reno, 509
U.S. 630 (1993).
181. In accordance with Justice O'Connor's suggestion in Croson, the traditional
target to remedy government discrimination is tied to minority availability. See supra
notes 20, 62 and accompanying text. This actual minority availability percentage, however,
needs to be adjusted to take into account what availability would be "but for"
discrimination. See supra Part III.
182. Since government and private total purchases are assumed to be 20 and 80
respectively, minority enterprises sell 2 to the government (20 x .1) and 4 to private
purchasers (80 x .05), which amounts to 6 out of 100 sales.
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and expressive harm restrictions of the Fourteenth Amendment) should
be able to tolerate a 4 percentage point overutilization.18 3
In practice, limiting the government remedy to proportional over-
utilization will steer public affirmative action far away from the 100 per-
cent problem. Under this standard, the government's targets will be
much closer to the estimate of minority availability (the traditional Croson
utilization target). Proportional overutilization never generates a govern-
ment utilization target percentage more than twice the estimate of minor-
ity availability. 18 4 Since estimates of minority firm availability are often
less than 15 percent,185 and government purchases usually compose only
a small portion of the combined public and private market, most govern-
ment remedial targets will be less than 25 percent and we predict that
many will be less than 20 percent.
These limitations alone may be sufficient to insure that "a racial goal
not substantially exceed the percentage of minority group members in
the relevant population."18 6 The proportional overutilization standard
certainly does not make remedying private discrimination a transcendent
government goal. This standard will normally allow the government to
remedy only a small fraction of private discrimination. If the govern-
183. A slightly less conservative target would be to measure minority underutilization
not in the overall market but in the private market alone, and then to use the degree of
private underutilization as the standard for government overutilization. In our example,
since the private market minority underutilization was 5 percentage points, the
government under this alternative measure would be able to overutilize by 5 percentage
points-setting a 15 percent minority procurement goal.
184. The gross percentage of underutilization can never be more than the availability
estimate. If minority firm availability is 10 percent, then the most underutilization could
be is 10 percentage points. Therefore, as a theoretical matter, limiting the amount of
government overutilization to the gross percentage of underutilization in the overall
market will cap the government's goal at some amount less than or equal to tvice the
minority availability estimate.
185. Local governments defending affirmative action plans after Crosan have generally
reported MBE availability figures below 15 percent. See, e.g., Concrete Works of Colo.,
Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1524 (10th Cir. 1994) (11 percent
availability); Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 6 F.3d 990, 1009 (3d Cir. 1993)
(2.4 percent availability); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 916 (11th Cir.
1990) (12 percent availability); Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Columbus, 936 F.
Supp. 1363, 1372 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (2.27 percent availability). But see O'Donnell Constr.
Co. v. District of Columbia, 963 F.2d 420, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (34 percent availability);
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coalition for Econ. Equity, 950 F.2d 1401, 1414
(9th Cir. 1991) (availabilities ranging from 36 percent to 49.5 percent). The lower figures
are not surprising given that only 8.9 percent of all businesses nationwide were minority-
owned in 1992. See Stephanopoulos & Edley, supra note 22, at 62-63. This figure is close
to the 10 percent goal of the federal program upheld in Fullilove. Fullilove v. Klutznick,
448 U.S. 448, 454 (1980).
186. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 199 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
In light of the evidence of federal overutilization in some markets we presented in
Part I, some federal affirmative action programs may not meet this standard. At the same
time, private discrimination mayjustify current levels of affirmative action in other markets
and suggest areas for constitutionally permissible expansion.
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ment, as in Fullilove, purchases only a small percentage of the country's
construction services, then it will only be able to remedy a small percent-
age of the private underutilization. If there are expressive harms "when
race concerns appear to submerge all other legitimate [governmental]
values," 187 then the proportional underutilization approach should with-
stand expressive harm scrutiny.
Indeed, proportional underutilization may concede too much.
Justice O'Connor's suggestion in Paradise that a government's utilization
goal could not substantially exceed minority availability, was qualified by
the phrase "absent compelling justification."188 Since Croson ordains
remedying private discrimination as a compelling government interest,
the proportional overutilization standard may throw away too much of
the remedial baby with the "expressive harms" bath water.189
A more aggressive approach for calculating the government's utiliza-
tion target would estimate minority availability assuming that the un-
derutilized capacity in the private sector was shifted to the public sector.
Returning to our previous example, if government purchases represent
20 percent of the overall market, and if private minority utilization is half
of minority overall availability (5 percent versus 10 percent), then these
assumptions imply that minority firms could supply 25 percent of the ca-
pacity needed for the government contracts. 190 Even though, by assump-
187. Pildes & Niemi, supra note 171, at 526-27.
188. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 199 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
189. If one accepts our assertion that the critical constitutional defect of a 100 percent
goal in the procurement context is the resulting expressive harm, then it follows that the
highest percentage goal that does not generate expressive harms is constitutional. Thus,
the logical inquiry is: What is the maximum minority utilization goal that avoids expressive
harm? The most satisfactory answer would approximate the results of a hypothetical survey
of public opinion iith respect to a spectrum of utilization goals. Perhaps expressive harm
results whenever the goal "substantially exceed[s]" availability. Id. at 199 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). At the other extreme, perhaps mere token nonminority participation is
sufficient to demonstrate that the government has not allowed "race concerns . . . to
submerge all other legitimate [governmental] values," Pildes & Niemi, supra note 171, at
527, or at least that the government has not maintained "a racially segregated... market."
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989). These examples
demonstrate that the phrase "expressive harms" is not self-defining. Outlining the upper
limit of a procurement goal seems to be as arbitrary as deciding when irregular voting
districts are unconstitutional. But while selecting the maximum percentage goal that
avoids expressive harms may seem somewhat arbitrary, at least the rationale is clear. In
contrast, the proposals discussed in the text offer precise methodologies to calculate
minority procurement goals, but are not narrowly tailored to avoid expressive harms.
Nonetheless, these methodologies yield goals narrowly tailored to remedy private
discrimination, since any goal up to 100 percent could survive this prong of strict scrutiny.
And because these proposals will generally produce goals well below 100 percent, we
believe they avoid "expressive harms" under any plausible definition of that phrase. They
are designed to yield nonarbitrary goals, not to push the envelope of constitutionality.
190. Again, since government and private total widget purchases are assumed to be 20
and 80 respectively, minority enterprises sell 2 to the government (20 x .1) and 4 to the
private market (80 x .05), which amounts to 6 out of 100 sales. See supra note 182. Private
discrimination would free up an additional 4 widgets that minorities might supply to the
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lion, minority firms represent only 10 percent of overall capacity, private
discrimination frees up some of this capacity to compete for government
contracts. This "shifting availability" approach still avoids the 100 percent
problem because even taking into account the shift of minority capacity
toward vying for government contracts (because of private discrimina-
tion), the minority percentage of firms competing for government pro-
curement deals will always be less than 100 percent.
The "shifting availability" approach, however, calls into question why
we even need to use affirmative action to remedy private discrimination
at all. If the minority capacity freed by private discrimination is truly
available-in the sense of being qualified, willing, and able-to compete
for government contracts, then this disproportionately large group of mi-
nority bidders should be able to garner a disproportionate share of the
public contracts even without affirmative action.1 91 As long as we are
government. Minority sellers would offer 6 (2 + 4) and nonminority sellers would offer 18
for a total widget capacity from minority and nonminority firms of 24. Minority availability
under this approach would be 6/24 or 25 percent.
An even more aggressive approach would also estimate how much less nonminority
firms were available to supply the government given the overutilization of nonminority
capacity in the private market. Applied to our example, private overutilization of
nonminorities would reduce nonminorities' capacity to supply the public market from 18
to 14. Minority sellers would offer 6 of 20 widgets offered to the government for an
estimated minority availability of 30 percent. For a more rigorous example of the general
equilibrium effect of racial overutilization in a two sector model, seeJohnJ. Donohue III &
James Heckman, Continuous Versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy
on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29J. Econ. Literature 1603 (1991). We discuss further
ramifications of this approach below. See infra text accompanying notes 192-195.
191. This criticism is related to even more fundamental arguments about whether
free market competition can drive out discrimination or its effects. See, e.g., Gary S.
Becker, The Economics of Discrimination (2d ed. 1971); Richard A. Epstein, Forbidden
Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimination Laws 9 (1992) ("Competitive
markets with free entry offer better and more certain protection against invidious
discrimination than any anti-discrimination law."); Ian Ayres, Price and Prejudice, New
Republic, July 6, 1992, at 30 ("[Epstein's] argument is not that bigots don't exist. But he
believes that in an unregulated market, it would be as ifbigotry didn't exist."). Under this
theory, discrimination by a few private buyers would not have any effect on overall minority
utilization because the affected minority sellers would just turn around and sell their
capacity to the non-discriminating portion of buyers-including public purchasers.
Policymakers should be attuned to whether the nondiscriminating portion of the
private market itself has the ability to soak up the excess minority capacity created by the
discriminatory portion of the private market-or whether race-neutral policies might
generate a more competitive industry structure which would allow private market forces to
mitigate the effects of private discrimination. Affirmative action in government
procurement at times could crowd out a private response by nondiscriminators. See also
supra note 106 (discussing the possibility that government affirmative action could
exacerbate private discrimination). In other contexts, government affirmative action can
promote enhanced private purchases-for example, by demonstrating to the private
market the viability of minority enterprises. See supra note 5 (discussing how the
government's affirmative action with regard to Marian Anderson ultimately led the private
market to stop discriminating). As a matter of prudent policy, the government's attempts
to remedy private discrimination stand on strongest ground to the extent that such policies
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confident that government agents are not continuing to discriminate co-
vertly against minority bidders, then the government's competitive bid-
ding process by itself would have the effect of remedying a substantial
part of private discrimination.
One answer of course is that we may not be confident that govern-
ment agents are not finding ways to discriminate covertly against a dispro-
portionately large group of minority bidders.1 92 But as an empirical mat-
ter, we believe that a more satisfying answer to this objection combines
elements of both the but-for and single-marketjustifications. Private dis-
crimination in all likelihood not only causes minority capacity to shift
toward a less discriminatory government sector but also reduces minority
capacity. As discussed above, minority firms subjected to upstream dis-
crimination by their suppliers will have higher costs of doing business and
have more difficulty winning low-bid procurement competitions. 193 A
but-for adjustment that estimates how much capacity minority firms
would have for government service in the absence of private discrimina-
tion thus could potentially go a long way toward implementing a "shifting
availability" approach.' 9 4 But-for adjustments not only can reduce the
skewing effect of private discrimination on government purchasing, but
by estimating shifting minority availability this approach can also indi-
rectly compensate for private underutilization itself. Bidding data in par-
ticular can provide rich statistical evidence to make this availability
adjustment. 195
Whether the government opts for the more aggressive "shifting avail-
ability" approach or the more conservative "proportional overutilization"
strategy, the foregoing discussion shows that the 100 percent problem is
not insurmountable. Indeed, if a government were truly serious about
remedying the effects of private discrimination without setting a 100 per-
cent minority procurement goal, the government might instead en-
promote (or at least do not retard) the ability of the private market to compensate for the
effects of private discrimination.
192. If we estimate that 25 percent of the capacity available for government purchases
comes from minority businesses, then the fact that the government achieves only a 17
percent minority utilization rate, for example, might be evidence of government
discrimination as well.
193. See supra note 130.
194. Here, the but-for adjustment would not simply ask how much larger minority
firms would be on average, but, holding private sales constant, how much more capacity
would be available for government service.
195. Using a limited dependent variable regression (such as logit or probit), it would
be possible to estimate the probability of a firm winning a government contract given a
variety of capacity-related variables (age, capital, employment) and whether or not the firm
is minority-owned. If regressions estimated that minority firms win 20 percent fewer
contracts than nonminority firms with the same capacity characteristics, it would suggest
that, but for discrimination, MBEs would win 20 percent more contracts. If MBEs
currently win 5 percent of government contracts, this analysis would suggest that they have
the capacity to win 20 percent more, so an affirmative action plan could reasonably set a 6
percent (=1.2 x .05) utilization goal.
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courage more private purchases from affected minority firms. Instead of
buying 100 percent of its pencils from minority firms, the government
might use a variety of means to encourage private purchasers to buy, say,
10 percent of their pencils from minority firms.196 Setting a goal that
private firms do not underutilize minority sellers would most directly
remedy private discrimination without creating the expressive harm asso-
ciated with an all-minority government contracting corps. Another ad-
vantage of this approach is its potential to provide a complete remedy in
markets where government spending is insufficient to compensate for
private underutilization.
197
V. PUBLIC REMEDIES FOR PRiVATE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
While this Article has focused on racial' 98 affirmative action in gov-
ernment procurement, 199 the single-marketjustification can also be used
196. For instance, the government could impose a "tax" on firms that do not meet
industry-specific minority utilization goals. This tax might be deemed more fair because
the cost of underutilization would be borne more directly by putative discriminators than
by the general public.
197. Even though the federal government has attempted an analogous employment
regulation with regard to government contractors, we are under no illusion that this direct
solution to the 100 percent problem is likely to be adopted in the current political climate.
198. Our analysis might also be useful in assessing whether the government can
constitutionally remedy other types of private discrimination-such as discrimination
based on religion. The government remedies private religious discrimination because
religion, like race, is a suspect classification for government regulation. There are no
religious preference programs in government procurement, but the government does take
religion-conscious action in other areas. Most commonly, the government is required on
free exercise grounds to accommodate certain religious practices of its employees (e.g.,
not working on the Sabbath). Thejustification for religious accommodations, however, is
to alleviate the burdens on religious minority groups resulting from government actions or
policies, so private discrimination seems largely irrelevant.
A more interesting question is whether the government could choose to display
publicly particular religious symbols to remedy private discrimination. In Allegheny County
v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, Justice O'Connor upheld against an Establishment Clause
challenge a display on public property including ajewish menorah and a Christmas tree.
492 U.S. 573, 632 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
While O'Connor admitted that the menorah was a clearly religious symbol, she
nonetheless concluded "that the city did not endorse Judaism or religion in general, but
rather conveyed a message of pluralism and freedom of belief during the holiday season."
Id. at 635. As one commentator concluded, "[rleligious displays of faiths which have
clearly been the subject of past and present discrimination by a particular community
would be less likely to raise endorsement problems than religious displays of sects that
cannot point to such a background." Tseming Yang, Race, Religion, and Cultural Identity:
Reconciling the Jurisprudence of Race and Religion, 73 Ind. LJ. 119, 183 (1997). This
inquiry into the particular community is consistent with our single-marketjustification for
race-conscious government action, and the more general principle that the message
conveyed by government action matters, supports our "expressive harm" restriction on
public affirmative action.
199. Focusing on procurement is somewhat unusual even though more than 10
billion dollars is allocated annually by race-conscious federal and state procurement. Legal
academics show a disproportionate interest in assessing whether affirmative action in
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to validate remedial race consciousness in public employment where the
government at times competes with the private market.200 It would be
perverse to argue that the state or federal government "can use its spend-
ing powers to remedy private discrimination" 20' when paying for urinals
but not when paying for secretarial services. Surely, the government's
interest in remedying private discrimination in employment is just as
compelling as in wholesale commercial markets-if not more so. This
Part sketches how the government might go about estimating these forms
of private discrimination "with the particularity required by the
Fourteenth Amendment."202
education is constitutional. For example, a LEXIS search of law reviews (LAWREV Library,
ALLREV File (Sept. 29, 1998)) found 593 articles with "affirmative action" w/10 education,
but only 204 articles with "affirmative action" w/10 (procurement or contracting).
200. Private discrimination might also serve as a new basis for affirmative action in
higher education adnission. The University of Texas in the recent Hopwood litigation tried
to defend its affirmative action program with both diversity and remedial rationales.
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 948 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
But as is all too often the case, the appellate court concluded that the state had the power
to remedy only its own past discrimination. Quoting Wygant, the Fifth Circuit found, as in
Taxman, that:
The Supreme Court has "insisted upon some showing of prior discrimination by
the governmental unit involved before allowing limited use of racial
classifications in order to remedy such discrimination." . . . Accordingly, the
state's use of remedial racial classifications is limited to the harm caused by a
specific state actor.
Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 949-50 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274
(1986) (plurality opinion of Powell,J.) (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433
U.S. 299 (1977))); see also Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1563 (3d
Cir. 1996) (en banc) ("[A] non-remedial affirmative action plan cannot form the basis for
deviating from the antidiscrimination mandate of Title VII ... the Board's adoption of its
affirmative action policy . . . was not intended to remedy the results of any prior
discrimination or identified underrepresentation of Blacks within the Piscataway School
District's teacher work force as a whole."), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (June 27, 1997),
cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (Dec. 2, 1997). Once again, the appellate courts are mired in
a Wygant world.
Private discrimination against minorities in higher education is-as an empirical
matter-probably not nearly as significant as in many job markets. But there are still
undoubtedly some private educational institutions that discriminate against minorities.
Bob Jones University completely excluded African Americans from enrollment until 1971.
And to this day the University "continues to deny admission to applicants engaged in an
interracial marriage or known to advocate interracial marriage or dating." BobJones Univ.
v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 581 (1983) (holding that nonprofit private schools that
prescribe and enforce racially discriminatory admission standards do not qualify as tax-
exempt organizations). Even though affirmative action in favor of minorities may be the
order of the day in most United States law schools, there is a possibility that the University
of Texas compete.; with private law schools that discriminate against minorities in
admission. If a government school could show minority underutilization in 'private law
schools in the same geographic market, it should be constitutionally allowed to favor
minority applicants to counteract the effect of the private discrimination.
201. City of Richmond v. JA. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989).
202. Id.
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The analogy to employment is direct. Among the many services that
the government routinely procures are labor services from employees.
Given the pervasive evidence of private discrimination in employ-
ment2 0 3-notwithstanding the threat of Title VII liability-private dis-
crimination, as an empirical matter, has the potential to justify broad pro-
grams of affirmative action in government employment.
If, for example, qualified minority accountants were being discrimi-
nated against-and therefore underutilized-by private employers, the
government would be justified in favoring minorities in its hiring to
counteract the effects of the private discrimination. Because both public
and private employers hire accountants, a race-conscious hiring prefer-
ence can be consistent with the unjust enrichment principle. Nonmi-
nority accountants who are disadvantaged by the government's affirma-
tive action are not unduly burdened if they are being overutilized in the
private sector by garnering a disproportionate share of jobs.
As in the procurement context, the single-market rationale is lim-
ited. Government affirmative action in hiring would be justified only if
the disadvantaged nonminority applicants had the opportunity to com-
pete instead for private jobs where they were given an unjust advantage.
The government could not, for example, premise affirmative action in
hiring firefighters on private discrimination, because there are no private
markets for firefighters.20 4 But upon a showing that both the govern-
ment and private firms compete for a certain group of employees, the
government-consistent with the narrow tailoring requirements-should
be able to favor minority employees to counteract the effects of private
hiring discrimination.
The potential impact of the single-market rationale on affirmative
action in government employment can be vividly illustrated by the much
publicized Taxman case. 20 5 While the case directly presented the ques-
203. See Clear and Convincing Evidence: Measurement of Discrimination in America
(Michael Fix & RaymondJ. Struyk eds., 1993); Stephanopoulos & Edley, supra note 22, at
20-25; John J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 983 (1991); Roger Waldinger & Thomas Bailey,
The Continuing Significance of Race: Racial Conflict and Racial Discrimination in
Construction, 19 Pol. & Soc'y 291 (1991) (a case study of racial discrimination in the New
York construction industry); PrimeTime Live, supra note 19.
204. However, supply-side substitutability would still be relevant. Firefighting may be
more reasonably described as physical/semi-skilled labor. If so, the government as an
employer of firefighters may in reality be competing with a number of private employers-
including construction companies, for example. The government might then be justified
in increasing its minority hiring of physical/semi-skilled employees to compensate for
minority underutilization in this broader market. Recall the discussion of Alabama state
troopers, supra note 165.
205. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1547. In 1989, the Piscataway, New Jersey, Board of
Education decided for budgetary reasons
to reduce the teaching staff in the Business Department at Piscataway High
School by one. At that time, two of the teachers in the department were of equal
seniority, both having begun their employment with the Board on the same day
19981 1635
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
tion of whether a diversity justification for a race-conscious employment
decision violated Tide VII, the Third Circuit in deciding the matter went
out of its way to explain why a remedial theory could not validate the
school board's race-conscious action:
[In Wygant], the Court determined that under the Constitution
a public employer's remedial affirmative action initiatives are
valid only if crafted to remedy its own past or present discrimina-
tion; that is, societal discrimination is an insufficient basis for
"imposing discretionary legal remedies against innocent
people."
20 3
Here we see the Third Circuit en banc continuing to cleave to Wygant
notwithstanding Croson's explicit and repeated conclusion that a state
"has the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within
its own legislative jurisdiction."20 7 The Third Circuit quotation is also re-
vealing because of slippage between the first and second clauses. We
agree that "societal discrimination is an insufficient basis for 'imposing
discretionary legal remedies against innocent people,"' but we do not be-
lieve that this implies "a public employer's remedial affirmative action
initiatives are valid only if crafted to remedy its own past or present dis-
crimination." A public employer should not be able to favor minority
lawyers to remedy discrimination against minorities in society generally,
but a public employer should be able constitutionally to remedy private
discrimination against minority lawyers qua minority lawyers. Once again,
the nonminority lawyers who would be disadvantaged by such a public
program may be "innocent" of discriminating themselves, but they also
would have been unjustly enriched-unfairly advantaged-by private em-
ployment discrimination.
We are not arguing that evidence of private discrimination could
have changed the outcome of Taxman. It is unclear whether a high
school business department competes with private employers for appli-
cants. 208 But when private employers for substitute jobs discriminate
against minorities, the unjust enrichment principle is consonant with
Supreme Court jurisprudence distinguishing between race-conscious
nine years earlier. One of those teachers was... Sharon Taxman, who is White,
and the other was Debra Williams, who is Black. Williams was the only minority
teacher among the faculty of the Business Department. ... In prior decisions
involving the layoff of employees with equal seniority, the Board had broken the
tie through "a random process .... "
91 F.3d at 1551. Instead of flipping a coin, the Board laid off Taxman to preserve some
racial diversity in the school's business department. See id. at 1552. Taxman sued
claiming that her layoff violated Title VII. See id. The Third Circuit (en banc) agreed.
See id. at 1565.
206. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1560 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
274-76 (1986)).
207. Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-92.
208. See our discussions of supply substitutability, supra text accompanying notes
145-148, 165.
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decisionmaking in hiring and layoffs.209 The government employees dis-
advantaged by race-conscious layoffs are not unjustly enriched by the pri-
vate discrimination-or at least not in the same way as nonminority appli-
cants who, by hypothesis, are advantaged in competing for private jobs.
Despite the argument's logic and consistency with doctrine, remedying
private discrimination remains an important and largely unexplored ra-
tionale for justifying public affirmative action in employment.
An affirmative action program in public employment designed to
remedy private discrimination can also survive Title VII scrutiny. The
constitutional hurdle is higher than the statutory one,210 so we could ar-
gue that such a result follows a fortiori. Because the Court has developed
separate constitutional and statutory doctrines, however, we examine
Title VII explicitly.
Applying the legal standard announced in United Steelworkers of
America v. Weber,211 the Third Circuit in Taxman justified its holding that
the diversity rationale violated Title VII on the grounds that such a ration-
ale failed to "'have purposes that mirror those of the [Civil Rights Act of
1964]' and second, . . . 'unnecessarily trammel[ed] the interests of the
[nonminority] employees.'"212 In contrast to diversity, remedying dis-
crimination was the overarching goal of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,213 so
a program with this end satisfies the first prong of Weber.
On the second prong, the Weber Court noted three aspects of the
plan it upheld: (1) The plan did not require the discharge of white work-
ers and their replacement with new black hirees; (2) the plan did not
create an absolute bar to the advancement of white employees; and (3)
the plan was temporary, designed to eliminate a manifest racial imbal-
ance, not to maintain racial balance.214 A constitutional affirmative ac-
tion program in public hiring or promotion would avoid all of these vices,
209. "While hiring goals impose a diffuse burden, often foreclosing only one of
several opportunities, layoffs impose the entire burden of achieving racial equality on
particular individuals, often resulting in serious disruption of their lives. That burden is
too intrusive." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
210. "[T]he statutory prohibition with which [a public] employer must contend was
not intended to extend as far as that of the Constitution." Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 628 n.6 (1987).
One result of this lower statutory hurdle is that a private affirmative action program
could withstand a Title VII disparate treatment challenge, even though the statistical
evidence of discrimination justifying the program would not be sufficient to defend an
analogous government program against a constitutional challenge. See id. at 633 n.10
(distinguishing between the "manifest imbalance" Title VII standard and the "prima facie"
constitutional standard).
211. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
212. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ. of Piscataway, 91 F.3d 1547, 1550 (3d Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 208), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (June 27, 1997), cert.
dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (Dec. 2, 1997).
213. The Court has explicitly referred to "Title VII's purpose of eliminating the
effects of discrimination in the workplace." Johnson, 480 U.S. at 630.
214. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
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and thereby satisfy the second prong of Weber. A program based on a
private discrimination rationale would not create an "absolute bar" for
nonminorities because it is premised on the existence of discrimination
in favor of nonminorities in the private labor market. In the private mar-
ket, at least, opportunities for nonminorities are in (over-)abundance.
And, as discussed above,21 5 the affirmative action goals that we recom-
mend to remedy private discrimination would create racial preferences
for less than 25 percent of the publicjobs. In addition, such a program is
temporary in the sense that it will last only as long as the effects of the
private discrimination it seeks to counteract.2 16
CONCLUSION
Marian Anderson's voice should still be heard today. The basic no-
tion that the government should be able to correct for private discrimina-
tion resonates in the echoes of that Easter morning concert almost 60
years ago. Constitutional law has gone badly wrong if its principles would
bar a repeat performance. But many courts, legal commentators, and
even the Clinton Justice Department would do exactly that. Indeed, the
National Park Service's invitation to Anderson would have been unconsti-
tutional under the widely accepted interpretation of Wygant that the gov-
ernment can use affirmative action only to remedy its own discrimina-
tion.2 17 Anderson's invitation is an example of the pure single-market
justification. The government did not cause the DAR's refusal to deal (as
would be required by the causal justification); nor did private discrimina-
tion cause the government's invitation process to have a discriminatory
effect (as would be required by the but-for justification). Instead, the
National Park Service in making the invitation favored Anderson because
of her race in order to counteract the effects of private discrimination.
Contrary to the Wygant approach, we believe Eleanor Roosevelt was
right. The moral intuition that government resources can be used to
remedy private ciscrimination can withstand strict scrutiny. Nonminority
singers were admittedly disadvantaged by Anderson's invitation. But the
government's invitation was narrowly tailored to remedy private discrimi-
215. See supra notes 181-197 and accompanying text.
216. If the public program demonstrates to private employers the viability of
nondiscriminatory employment practices, then the program is temporary in the sense of
aiming at eliminating discrimination, rather than maintaining a permanent preference.
See supra note 191 (discussing possible impacts of public affirmative action on private
behavior). Alternatively, one could simply assume provision for expiration or regular
review. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also infra note 221 (discussing why a
"sunset" requirement is inappropriate).
217. Even those-like Justice Scalia-who would reject most affirmative action plan
validations for failing to provide individualized proof of discrimination would be hard
pressed to deny that. Anderson was the victim of identifiable discrimination. To be sure,
the federal government engaged in a large variety of discrimination. But the Equal
Protection clause does not allow the government to favor minority singers to make up for
the government's discrimination against, say, black soldiers.
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nation. Nonminority singers could hardly claim an undue burden when
they had such disproportionate access to private venues.
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson has constitutionalized this intu-
ition, but to date government actors have only rarely attempted to
ground public affirmative action on the basis of private discrimination. 218
Even more shockingly, the Clinton Justice Department has explicitly re-
jected the single-marketjustification.2 1 9 Proponents of affirmative action
ignore private discrimination at their own peril. Private markets are
larger and discriminate more than public markets. Even a limited ability
to remedy private discrimination might provide a broad basis for affirma-
tive action in government procurement.
220
This Article has attempted to articulate when private discrimination
can be used to justify a governmental race-conscious goal for utilizing
minority-owned enterprises. We have not addressed the difficult issues of
what quantum of evidence is necessary to establish private discrimination
or what means would be appropriate to implement the government's
goal. 221 Instead, given the hegemonic force of Wygant for the proposi-
tion that the government can only use racial preferences to remedy its
own discrimination, we have merely tried to identify when private dis-
crimination, standing alone, can justify government affirmative action.
Our causal and but-for justifications-as expressions of Justice
O'Connor's passive participant theory-stand on the firmest constitu-
tional footing. The government is a passive participant either when its
spending causes private discrimination or when private discrimination
causes otherwise neutral government procurement rules to unfairly ex-
218. The combined market statistics cited in Fullilove may implicitly be an attempt to
justify public affirmative action on the basis of private discrimination. See supra text
accompanying note 158. An exceptional case in which the government relied directly on
evidence of private discrimination is Concrete Works of C61o. v. City and County of
Denver, 36 F.3d 1513, 1529-30 (10th Cir. 1994).
219. See supra text accompanying note 9.
220. Indeed, a primary "problem" with taking the single-market rationale seriously is
that it can lead toward affirmative action goals as high as 100 percent. See supra Part IV.D.
221. As to the evidentiary issue, we believe that whatever types of evidence are
sufficient to prove public discrimination should be sufficient if found in analogous private
data to prove private discrimination. If Justice Scalia prevails in limiting remedies of
identifiable discrimination to instances of individualized proof, then it may be difficult for
the government to establish either public or private discrimination. Under this evidentiary
standard, strict scrutiny would become fatal in fact. As to the issue of the appropriate
means, we favor declining credit schedules as discussed at length in Ayres, Narrow
Tailoring, supra note 32, at 1808-22.
We have also not addressed at what point a remedy aimed at counteracting private
discrimination must end because of some "sunset" requirement. We do not believe that
public affirmative action needs to deter future private discrimination in order to be
narrowly tailored. Justice O'Connor's language in Croson that the government "has thJ
authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination" properly emphasizes that
removing the effects of discrimination is a compelling government interest-even if
eradicating future discrimination itself is not possible. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 491-92 (1989) (emphasis added).
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clude minority enterprises. Thus, when prime contractors discriminate
against minority subcontractors on government jobs, the government,
under the causal justification, can require minority subcontractors to be
favored. And when private contractor associations refuse to accredit mi-
nority contractors, the government, under the but-for justification, can
adjust its bidding requirements to counteract the effects of the private
discrimination.
While the appropriateness of making but-for adjustments to minority
availability estimates is widely accepted,222 scholars have not appreciated
that the but-for rationale might readily justify the government's deviating
from simply awarding contracts to the lowest bidder. If private suppliers
(of, say, credit or steel) systematically charge higher prices to minority
firms, then a government's awarding contracts to the low-cost bidder
would make the government a passive participant in the private discrimi-
nation (just as much as in the contractor accreditation example). Remov-
ing the effect of private discrimination on government procurement
might require a government to estimate which firms would be available to
place winning bids in the absence of private discrimination and then to
award such firms bidding credits to recreate their ability to compete.
Finally, we have argued in favor of a single-market justification.
When minority and nonminority firms compete for government sales, the
government may prefer minority contractors in its purchases in order to
remedy private discrimination in the same market. While Justice
O'Connor in Croson gave passive participant examples of the causal and
but-for justificrations, neither her reasoning nor her conclusion limits the
government's remedial power to private discrimination that it has caused
or to private discrimination that distorts the government's own procure-
ment process. Instead, the government has a compelling interest "to
eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its own legislative
jurisdiction . . .[and it] can use its spending powers to remedy private
discrimination, if it identifies that discrimination with the particularity
required by the Fourteenth Amendment."223 The crucial issues are
whether the remedy can be non-arbitrary and not unduly burdensome.
We believe that limiting government preference to remedying private dis-
crimination in the same market provides an adequate nexus between the
remedy and the harm to fulfill these requirements. Nonminority firms
disfavored by the government's affirmative action are not unduly bur-
222. While the benchmark will be based in large part on the existing capacity and
availability of minority-owned firms, consideration will also be given to the extent
to which the effects of racial discrimination have impeded the ability of minority
individuals tc become entrepreneurs, and the ability of minority-owned firms to
grow.
Response to Comments to Department ofJustice Proposed Reforms to Affirmative Action
in Federal Procw-ement, 62 Fed. Reg. 25,648, 25,650 (1997); see also Participation by
Disadvantaged Business Enterprise in Department of Transportation Programs, 62 Fed.
Reg. 29,548, 29,557-58 (1997) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 26.41) (endorsing but-for
adjustment). But see La Noue & Sullivan, supra note 110; Rosen, supra note 12.
223. Croson, 488 U.S. at 491-92.
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dened, if they are overutilized because of their race by private purchasers
of the same product.
Building on a few hundred words in Croson, we have tried to con-
struct a full theory of how the government might constitutionally act to
remedy private discrimination. We are not unmindful that-especially in
the civil rights arena-the Supreme Court of late has been willing to in-
terpret away far more settled precedents.2 24 But private discrimination is
empirically so salient that governments defending against Croson-type
claims need to develop explicit evidence of private underutilization to
validate public affirmative action. This is not a subterfuge. Discrimina-
tion is predominantly practiced in private markets. As Eleanor Roosevelt
realized long ago, it is only natural to use government power to remedy
its effects.
224. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995) (closing the door on
interdistrict school desegregation remedies previously left open by Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 745 (1974), and Hills v. Gautreaux, 425 U.S. 284, 294 n.11 (1976)); Wards Cove
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660-61 (1989) (effectively overruling the long-
standing CGiggs rule that an employer can only justify by "business necessity" an
employment practice with a disparate impact).
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